This article was originally published in Vol. 5 No. 1 of our print edition.
The US elections, which took place on 5 November 2024, resulted in a landslide Republican victory. Donald J. Trump returned to the White House while the GOP won majorities in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Although polls before the election had anticipated a close result, the patriotic side beat progressives by more than two million individual votes.1 Whereas most of the world watched the battle for the Oval Office with bated breath, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán loudly and consistently proclaimed that he not only expected Trump to take back the presidency but sincerely wished him to do so. Thanks to Orbán’s unwavering support for Trump, the personal relationship between the two statesmen has become very strong during the Biden administration when US–Hungary relations hit rock bottom. But what were bilateral relations like earlier? How will the close alliance between Trump and Orbán develop in the future? And can Budapest become Washington’s main East Central European ally?
Hungary’s Role in the CEE Region
Hungary is a country in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), which lost out during the twentieth century in almost every field. After the First World War, nearly 70 per cent of its territory and 60 per cent of its population were lost and divided among neighbouring countries.2 Shortly after the Second World War, Hungary lost further lands and also its sovereign independence, without any real hope of regaining it. A few years after the war, in alliance with other socialist countries, Hungary formed the border region and the buffer zone between East and West. Although the legislature functioned, strategic decisions were made in the imperial capital, Moscow.
In the bipolar world, the most significant difference between East and West was the democratic deficit of the socialist states, which had an impact at both individual and communal levels. The unquestionable ruler of this world was the Communist Party, which was committed to realizing its radical left ideology at all costs. People living under socialism were severely restricted not solely in terms of travel or business but also in exercising their fundamental human rights, including freedom of assembly and expression. As early as 1956, the Hungarian people rebelled against totalitarianism, making it clear to the whole world that they did not wish to go on living behind the Iron Curtain. They wanted to transform their suppressed country into a sovereign, independent, democratic state that would make its own choices and decide on its destiny. Unfortunately, at that time, no help arrived from the West and Hungary was left alone; the Soviet Union, because of its overwhelming military power, could rapidly put down the uprising and reassert control over the rebel state for many decades.
However, after the political events of 1989 and the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, the states of Central and Eastern Europe regained their independence. Hungary promptly committed itself to democratic values and Euro-Atlantic integration. At the time, there was no doubt as to where a free Hungary would turn. Hungarians had proved themselves to be a part of the Western tradition long before the twentieth century; the anti-Islamic wars of bygone eras sealed this determination with blood. After the regime change, the nation had to make sacrifices again. There was strong demand for this, both externally and internally. However, the Euro-Atlantic integration process did not occur overnight, as neither side was sufficiently prepared for it. The Western partners, which had never been affected by real socialism, lacked the political will to absorb the problems of the CEE region, so they set demanding preconditions for those wishing to join them. Hungary, having regained its sovereignty, which had been lost to the East, was thus almost immediately expected to offer it to the West. Nation states that had just escaped the yoke of communism and sought to be reborn had to meet countless new expectations to gain admission through the gates of the West. All this happened with an outdated and collapsing economic system and a developing socio-political crisis.
Admission to the West required more than establishing, maintaining, and enforcing the written and unwritten rules of democracy. To achieve inclusion, like other CEE countries, Hungary had to adopt the norms and suggestions of numerous governmental and non-governmental organizations that monitored almost all aspects of a country’s functioning under an international treaty or on a civilian basis. These institutions simultaneously represented particular values and interests; compliance with them, therefore, entailed giving up a slice of sovereignty. As a result, liberation from the Soviets did not mean reaching the desired state of self-determination but entailed a commitment—and indeed a surrender—to the West.
Due to ceaseless expectations, Euro-Atlantic integration did not happen quickly; it took over a decade to complete. In addition to the democratic functioning of the rule of law and the market economy, the main precondition for joining NATO was for the acceding state to declare that it would not make territorial claims against other countries, to commit to a gradual increase in its annual military spending to 2 per cent, and to modernize its armed forces.3 Hungary submitted to all requirements. Accession negotiations with the EU took even longer than with NATO, as implementing the four freedoms of the Community—beyond the democratic rule of law—requires giving up distinctive features of state sovereignty (such as a separate customs policy), fully and completely implementing EU legislation, and adjusting internal laws, rules, and regulations to it. The acceding states had to constantly prove the existence of a functioning separation of powers and the practical operation of a system of checks and balances. Hungary did all the homework it was assigned by the West and passed every exam.
‘Today, however, different winds are blowing’
Entering NATO and the EU did not mean full equality, however, since most old members—including Austria and Germany but excluding Ireland—did not apply EU law on free movement to workers for the eight newly joined countries, including Hungary, for seven more years.4 Despite all these inequities, by the middle of 2004, the former Warsaw Pact countries had returned home and had become Western again. Yet even then it was apparent that the process of economic reconciliation would be neither quick nor smooth. However, nobody expected that the democratic transformation and the achievements of Hungary, which have been proven countless times over the last thirty years, would once again be called into question.
A Short History of US–Hungarian Relations
The first US diplomatic posting to the Kingdom of Hungary arrived just over a century and a half ago, in 1869.5 Decades later, after the First World War, an American legation was opened in Budapest. During the Second World War, yielding to the will of the Third Reich, Hungary declared war on the United States in 1941. Since President Franklin Delano Roosevelt was convinced that Budapest’s move had been made solely under pressure from Berlin, the US only reciprocally declared war in 1942. After 1945, relations began to normalize. Although the Hungarian freedom fighters begged for it, the United States did not provide military assistance against the Soviet Union during the 1956 Revolution out of the fear of a nuclear conflict with the Soviets. However, more than 32,000 Hungarians were given the opportunity to flee the reprisals and escape to the USA, where they could start a new life. Ten years after the Revolution, the legation in Budapest was raised to embassy status.6 As a clear sign of improving relationships and better times, the Carter administration decided that the Holy Crown of Hungary, along with coronation jewels, should be returned to ‘the Hungarian nation’.7 The priceless treasures had been placed in American safekeeping after the Second World War and kept at Fort Knox, Kentucky, until their return. The US also helped Hungary during the time of the ‘regime change’. The Support for East European Democracy (SEED) Act was adopted in late 1989. It aimed to support and assist Hungary and Poland in institutionalizing political democracy and economic pluralism and to mobilize international financial institutions to provide resources to them.8
‘Orbán was the first sitting politician in the world to admit that a Trump victory would be better for Europe’
After 1989, Hungary promptly committed itself to democratic values and Euro- Atlantic integration. This commitment was adopted by the right-wing governments of József Antall and Péter Boross between 1990 and 1994, and by the socialist–liberal government led by Gyula Horn between 1994 and 1998. During this period, the most critical expectations from the West were the maintenance of democracy and the free market, while running the economy was the most challenging endeavour. Unlike in 1956, after the ‘regime change’, the United States supported Hungary’s efforts to become a modern democracy. Trade relations gradually expanded, and Western companies began to invest in the Central and Eastern European region. The US became one of Hungary’s most important foreign investors, contributing to job creation and economic growth.9
Cooperation was evident in many fields. Besides business links, cultural exchanges, conferences, and joint projects have enriched relations, fostering mutual understanding and respect between the two nations. Significant collaborations have developed between American and Hungarian higher education institutions. Many Hungarian students, researchers, and athletes have been given the opportunity to study, conduct research, and train in the USA. As a result of such synergy, in 1999, during the first Orbán government (1998–2002)10 Hungary joined NATO. At that time, US–Hungarian bilateral relations were excellent; President Bill Clinton hosted Prime Minister Viktor Orbán in the Oval Office of the White House.11 Entering the military alliance further strengthened bilateral ties. Hungary regularly participated in joint military exercises and—under leftist leadership—contributed to international missions led by the United States, such as in Iraq and Afghanistan.12 Relations remained excellent for many years.
Between 2002 and 2010, Hungary was led by a socialist–liberal coalition government. In 2004, with Prime Minister Péter Medgyessy in office, Hungary joined the European Union. However, shortly after the outbreak of the global financial and capital markets crisis, with Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány in office, the country almost went bankrupt.13 Gyurcsány resigned in 2009, but early elections were not called. The leadership was taken over by a government of ‘experts’ headed by Gordon Bajnai as prime minister.14 Severe austerity measures and IMF borrowing somewhat consolidated the budget.15 However, the Hungarian political left has been suffering the political consequences ever since.
In the 2010 parliamentary elections, the political right won a historic victory.16 This was a key moment in Viktor Orbán’s political career. After two failed elections, his party returned with unprecedented power, gaining two thirds of the seats in Parliament. Orbán described this large-scale victory17 as ‘the people’s revolution in the polling booths’.18 However, his situation was far from easy. In 2002, he handed over the leadership of a regional front-runner country to a coalition formed by the Hungarian Socialist Party and the Alliance of Free Democrats, but in 2010, the country he returned to power in was lagging, impoverished, and in a state of urgent vulnerability in every field.19
Orbán had made evident that the extent of the changes would be proportional to the size of the mandate he received from the people. This has not changed since, provoking strong criticism among the Western elites and the opinion-forming media. The neoliberal social and economic policy represented by the former progressive Hungarian governments (2002–2010) was followed by a robust conservative turn, including several radical, or, as government communication termed it, ‘unorthodox’ elements. The new leadership inherited debt amounting to 80.6 per cent of Hungary’s GDP,20 much of which was external. The reduction of this liability and its transformation into an internal one was defined as a fundamental objective. International criticism of the country and its leadership began in parallel to the profit divestment measures. The new government obliged banks, telecommunication and energy companies to pay21 a special tax from their profits, mobilizing a massive international lobbying force against the country’s new leadership. In addition, measures such as the creation of a united pension scheme, the reduction of the powers of the Constitutional Court, the adoption of a new press law, the reform of the electoral system, and the almost complete abolition of the private pension fund system were also fulfilled. For citizens living across the border with verifiably Hungarian ancestry, a decision was made to simplify their acquisition of Hungarian citizenship.22 This caused resentment in the neighbouring countries, who were constantly afraid that Hungary would, at some point, try to get back the territories it lost as a consequence of the First World War in 1920.
‘There is a historic chance for US–Hungary relations to peak’
From 2010, in both words and deeds, the dominance of vaguely articulated but well-defined national interest came to the fore, in contrast to the previous neoliberal model in which the benefits had accrued to foreign businesses. However, all this caused such a negative international response and resistance that it left a mark on the Hungarian presidency of the Council of the European Union in the first half of 2011, diverting attention from its professional achievements. At the same time, Hungary’s responses to the allegations fell on deaf ears. International critics called for the neoliberal status quo to be maintained, ignoring the fact that the people had given the political right a two-thirds majority in Parliament precisely to change that.
International criticism continued to mount in the summer of 2014, when Orbán, newly re-elected prime minister and just beginning his third term in office, stated at a Transylvanian (Romanian) free university meeting that ‘democracy is not necessarily liberal. Something that is not liberal can still be democracy’.23 Political analysts immediately linked his declaration to Fareed Zakaria’s 1997 study of illiberal democracies published in Foreign Affairs.24 In this paper, the internationally renowned author argued that these democratically elected regimes routinely ignore the constitutional limits of their power, depriving citizens of their fundamental rights and freedoms. Ever since this ominous-sounding speech by Orbán, the image of a desire for illiberalism has become synonymous with the Hungarian prime minister in the international press, and he has been unable to rid himself of it. The resonance of this phrase was so strong that Orbán was forced to return to the concept several times and interpret it. In a 2015 European Parliament debate, he said, ‘Illiberal democracy sounds perfectly good in Hungarian, but in English, it sounds like a blood libel’.25 Two years later, also on the floor of the European Parliament, he even joked about the concept, saying, ‘Illiberal democracy is when liberals don’t win’.26 In 2019, at his lecture at the same Transylvanian free university as before, Orbán once again reflected on illiberalism, and reinterpreted his earlier thoughts—contrary to Fareed Zakaria’s view—simply as a metaphor for ‘Christian freedom’.27 However, even this did not find a sympathetic ear.
The fact that the West sees a problem in the functioning of democracy in Hungary is unequivocally demonstrated by the reports of the European Union. In its 2020 Rule of Law Report,28 the European Commission called for judicial independence, for compliance with the recommendations of the Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), and for an end to government advertisements interfering with the media market, and criticized the legislation on the transparency of foreign- funded non-governmental organizations. The 2024 Rule of Law Report29 is not favourable for Hungary either. It also criticized the judiciary, anti-corruption bodies, and media pluralism. Today’s debates concerning Hungary are heated and extreme, as witnessed in October 2024, at the Strasbourg plenary debate.30 At the same time, the fact that the Hungarian right has won four elections in a row with a constitutional majority shows that the population is not dissatisfied with the current state of affairs. Moreover, the fact that we are also witnessing an unprecedented conservative turn in the United States may further strengthen Orbán and his European allies.
Public Law, the Rule of Law, and Hungary
Although there has been a proliferation in the types of actors who influence the international system, with the emergence of non-state actors such as multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations, and international institutions, the state can still be considered the main and primary participant due to its original nature. International public law is created by the community of states; it is a set of norms and rules that can be considered the primary determinant of the relationship between them. The principle of international public law constitutes the sovereign equality of states. As a general rule, this primarily theoretical principle means that all states in the global community have the same rights and obligations despite the often astonishingly significant physical differences between them (e.g. military power or economic strength).
However, the reality is different. This is because the inequality-based, power-centred approach of the realist paradigm usually overrides theory. As in a state of nature, where it is rare for the wolf to realize that the rabbit also has a right to self-determination, dependence and the relationship between subordination and superiority can also be observed in interstate relations. The rule of law can be considered a practical philosophical legal concept, and one of the fundamental values of the European Union. Article 2 of the Treaty on European Union states: ‘The Union is founded on the values of the respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for the human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non- discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.’31 To ensure the continuity and preservation of these values, the institutions of the EU, together with NGOs, report on member states regularly.
Hungary was long a target of criticism from the USA, mainly due to alleged failings when it came to the rule of law. The Obama administration32 (2009–2017) was at the forefront of these accusations. Regarding Hungary, besides expressing its negative opinion, the US also aimed to intervene in the media situation. First, it approved $700,000 in support of the Hungarian ‘independent’ but actually opposition media.33 Ultimately, at that time, a transfer was not realized. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo tweeted on 5 January 2021 that ‘The Obama administration treated NATO ally Hungary like North Korea – total cold shoulder. We’ve renewed important ties while urging respect for democratic norms.’34 Barack Obama’s Republican successor, Donald J. Trump, broke radically with his predecessor’s Hungary policy, ending the constant criticism of the East Central European country.35 Moreover, the relationship between the USA and Hungary improved significantly during those four years.36
The foundations for good relations were laid by Orbán in the summer of 2016, when, at the previously mentioned Transylvanian free university meeting, he said the following: ‘I am not Donald Trump’s campaign manager; I never thought that the thought would ever arise in my head that he would still be the best for Europe and Hungary out of the open options, I never thought that, but the situation is that I listened to this candidate, and I must tell you that he has made three proposals to curb terrorism. As a European, I could hardly have expressed better what Europe needs.’37 Orbán stood by Trump even when the whole world was expecting the election of Hillary Clinton as US president.38 And yet, it is also true that Trump did not visit Budapest during his first term in office. Thus, George W. Bush is still the last US president to have come to Hungary,39 and when he did so in 2006, Orbán was not the country’s prime minister.40
After Joe Biden came to power in 2021, the reputation of Hungary in Washington sank to a new low. During the presidential debates in 2020, the Democratic Party leader branded Hungary as a ‘totalitarian regime’.41 Presumably, the fact that Hungary’s Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó responded to the remark in a sardonic video message, drawing attention to the suspected corruption cases of the then-presidential candidate Biden’s son in Ukraine42 probably did not help the situation either.
At that time, Hungary was already blocking NATO–Ukraine meetings at the ministerial level because ethnic Hungarians living in the Transcarpathian region of Ukraine were deprived of their right to education in their mother tongue.43 The Trump administration tolerated this step, but Biden no longer did so. Despite loud Hungarian opposition, the NATO secretary general convened a ministerial- level meeting of the NATO–Ukraine Committee in 2023.44 Regular criticism of Hungary’s domestic politics also returned to the routines familiar from when Hillary Clinton led the State Department. In addition, in June 2022, the US government terminated the Hungarian–American double taxation agreement.45 This was an unprecedented move in the relationship between two allied nations. To give a sense of the gravity of this decision, it is worth noting that the US government did not take such a step against Moscow, which was then treated as an enemy in Washington.
It was also a provocative move by the Biden administration to send as ambassador to Hungary David Pressman,46 who was not interested in bringing the positions of the two parties closer together but instead acted as a viceroy with a rather imperial attitude. In return, Viktor Orbán neither invited Pressman to his office nor met with him during his stay.47 This is also unprecedented in the history of the two allied nations. As a result of all this, the outcome of the 2024 US presidential election was of the utmost importance for Hungary. The country has been under double pressure for years: on the one hand, the European Commission has been trying to make the Orbán government’s position financially impossible, and Washington was a partner in this politically. If the intense pressure to crush Hungary had continued, it could have caused severe problems for the Orbán government. Today, however, different winds are blowing.
Given the aforementioned tensions, it is not surprising that the Hungarian prime minister was a central reference point in the American presidential campaign. While Democratic candidate Kamala Harris described Orbán as a ‘dictator’,48 her Republican counterpart, Trump, referred to him as an ‘exemplary statesman’.49 Moreover, as revealed in an analysis by the Budapest-based think tank the Center for Fundamental Rights, Orbán was the European leader referred to most often, a total of 109 times, by Trump in the year preceding the 2024 US presidential election, on average once every three days, and always in a positive context.50
The personal relationship between Trump and Orbán has become excellent in recent years. Orbán is possibly the world’s only active prime minister to have continually supported Trump since he entered politics, and has openly stated since the 2020 elections that he looks forward to his return. His wish came true. It was just icing on the cake that two months after the elections, in early 2025, Ambassador Pressman permanently departed from Hungary. However, he left behind two farewell gifts to the progressive side. First, he placed the second most powerful person in the Hungarian government, the prime minister’s Chief of Staff Antal Rogán, on a sanctions list under the Magnitsky Act.51 Secondly, what remained only a plan under the Obama administration became a reality under Biden, with the US Embassy led by Pressman distributing over $400,000 to media outlets critical of the Hungarian government.52 The identity of the next US ambassador accredited to Budapest is still unknown. Nevertheless, Bryan E. Leib’s name is increasingly being rumoured as a possible candidate for the position. Leib is a good friend of Hungary and a strong critic of Pressman, whose actions he has criticized on numerous occasions.53
It is clear that there is a great understanding, what is more, a synergy between Trump and Orbán. Their life paths, however, reveal both similarities and differences. One of the most significant contrasts concerns their journey into politics. Trump spent most of his life in the business and media world and became involved in public affairs only at the age when average citizens retire. In contrast, Orbán’s path led directly from university to Parliament. He has been a member of the Hungarian legislature continuously since 1990. Eight years later, at the age of thirty-five, he became prime minister. Although both Trump and Orbán embraced liberal ideals in their youth, they later forged international reputations as conservative statesmen. Another parallel in their careers is that they both experienced failure after their first term as leaders but managed to recover. Orbán needed two terms—eight years—to return as prime minister, while Trump regained the presidency in just half that time. The political views held by the two are also very similar. Both are followers of classical realism, believing in the interests of their nations and the primacy of power. They are convinced that the traditions of the past must be maintained and preserved. Neither believes in the ideals of an open society; in their politics, they champion the state and the importance of secure national borders. They consider good neighbourly relations to be important but not essential. At the same time, they do not tolerate any outside interference in their country’s internal affairs. Although many—including Ambassador Pressman—have accused Orbán of placing Hungary solely at the mercy of Trump, the Democrats, since the beginning of the second Orbán government (2010), have seen Budapest as neither an ally nor a partner with which they were willing to cooperate.
However, the full picture also includes the fact that Hungary’s policy in recent years has not been perceived as an undivided success in the Republican Party. One example is Jim Risch, a top Republican on the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who stopped a $735 million arms sale to Hungary in 2023 in response to Hungary’s temporary blocking of Sweden’s NATO accession.54 Consequently, winning Trump’s friendship does not automatically mean admittance to the heart of the GOP. Yet, it is also clear that both President Trump and Vice President Vance respect the Hungarian prime minister and value his opinion. If what has been suggested during the campaign is to be believed, when it comes to a question regarding Europe, Orbán’s perspective will be asked and considered. This potential ‘Trump card’ in Viktor Orbán’s hands may mean significant leverage in his ‘freedom fight’ with EU bureaucrats, including top officials, who have constantly sought to silence him and suppress his views.
We can also observe a concord if we examine the Trump–Orbán tandem from the perspective of critical affairs. On the issue of migration, Orbán has already built the wall in the southern part of Hungary that Trump also began to strengthen and build further on the US border with Mexico during his first term. During the election campaign, Trump continuously referred to Orbán as an exemplary leader who protected his country against illegal aliens. It is a fact that Hungary has maintained its migration policy despite being fined €200 million by the European Court of Justice last summer, with an additional fine of €1 million per day until the offending statute is modified. This is an unprecedented intervention by an EU body in a member state’s internal affairs and sovereignty. Hungary decided not to submit to the judgement and not pay it.55
Despite the relatively small size of his homeland, Orbán likes to play in the first line of world politics. As proof of his knowledge of how this ‘game’ is played, he was hosted by the presidents of Russia and China in early July 2024, a few days apart. Shortly before that, he met with the president of Ukraine and, later, with the then-presidential candidate Trump in Florida. It is unlikely that any other European statesman today would successfully gain admission through all these gates, especially in such rapid succession. For this reason, it can also be assumed that Orbán may become an essential asset in Trump’s plans. For Orbán, this could bring further international appreciation. At the same time, Trump has said countless times that he was elected president of the United States, not the president of the world. Where American national interests clash with Hungarian national interests—such as in relations with Beijing or Moscow—the CEE country will have to act with great wisdom. Their personal friendship and Orbán’s diplomatic sense might play a significant role in such cases. At the same time, Trump is an experienced businessman who believes in the ‘art of the deal’. It can be assumed that he will make a profitable deal with China and Moscow, giving Hungary the green light to do the same.
Conclusion
In sum, it should be noted that Trump has won a landslide victory in the US presidential election. He promised significant changes during the campaign, many of which he modelled on Hungary. Orbán was the first sitting politician in the world to admit that a Trump victory would be better for Europe. This happened in 2016. Nothing has changed since. The relationship between the two statesmen has become personal over the last eight years. Just as before, in 2024, Orbán was the most vocal supporter of the 45th US president during the election campaign to become the 47th. Although Hungary and the United States differ in many ways, the population gave the same mandate in the recent elections: to build and maintain a classic nation state and put it in first place. The path is, therefore, familiar, and while Orbán may be able to help the American president with the experience gained during his 35-year political career, Trump can give him a tailwind in matters where there have been only headwinds so far.
There is a historic chance for US–Hungary relations to peak, and it depends in no small part on the two leading players. Even though Hungary is a member of the EU and NATO, in the last two decades, American Democratic administrations have been explicitly hostile towards it. If the new Trump administration were to do no more than restore the 2016–2020 status quo (by reinstating the 1979 US–Hungary income tax treaty, lifting arms sales restrictions, and sending a new ambassador with a classic portfolio), there would be instant progress between the parties. However, the willingness to cooperate seems to go beyond that. With the US president behind him, Orbán could be much more effective in strengthening his conservative agenda in Brussels, which until now has been an uphill struggle. Since it seems that personal commitment is the most important thing for Trump, Orbán’s role may be significantly enhanced, not only when it comes to Washington, but also Brussels.
NOTES
1 James M. Lindsay, ‘The 2024 Election by the Numbers’, Council on Foreign Relations (18 December 2024), www.cfr.org/article/2024-election-numbers.
2 ‘Trianoni veszteségeink’ (Our Losses of Trianon), Magyar Nemzet (13 June 2010), https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum- magyarnemzet/2010/06/trianoni-vesztesegeink.
3 ‘Minimum Requirements for NATO Membership’, US Department of State, https://1997-2001.state.gov/regions/eur/fs_members.html, accessed 10 November 2024.
4 ‘Free Movement: Workers from Eight Member States That Joined EU in 2004 Finally Enjoy Full Rights’, European Commission (28 April 2011), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ ip_11_506.
5 ‘Key Dates in Hungarian–American Diplomatic Relations’, Embassy of Hungary in Washington, https://washington.mfa.gov.hu/eng/page/fontos-datumok, accessed 10 November 2024.
6 ‘Key Dates in Hungarian–American Diplomatic Relations’, Embassy of Hungary Washington, https://washington.mfa.gov.hu/eng/page/fontos-datumok, accessed 24 January, 2025.
7 ‘Negyven éve kaptuk vissza a Szent Koronát’ (The Holy Crown Was Returned Forty Years Ago), Index (6 January 2018), https://index.hu/tudomany/tortenelem/2018/01/06/negyven_eve_erkezett_vissza_a_korona_magyarorszagra/.
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9 ‘Economic Relations’, Embassy of Hungary Washington, https://washington.mfa.gov.hu/eng/page/economic-relations, accessed 11 November 2024.
10 ‘Orbán Viktor’ (Viktor Orbán), Magyarország Kormánya, https://kormany.hu/miniszterelnok/eletrajz, accessed 11 November 2024.
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12 Hautzinger Gyula, ‘Magyar katonai részvétel az Iraki Szabadság műveletben’ (Hungarian Military Participation in Operation Iraqi Freedom), Hadtudomány, 4 (2005), www.mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2005/4/2005_4_18.html; and ‘Hungary in Afghanistan’, Hungarian Government, https://2010-2014.kormany.hu/en/hungary-in-afghanistan/review, accessed 15 November 2024.
13 ‘Hungary Escapes Bankruptcy with International Aid’, France24 (2 November 2008), www.france24.com/en/20081102-hungary-escapes-bankruptcy-with-international-aid-hungary-imf.
14 ‘Bajnai az új kormányfő’ (Bajnai Is the New Prime Minister), Origo (14 April 2009), www.origo.hu/itthon/2009/04/kedden-szavaznak-a-gyurcsany-ferenccel-szembeni-bizalmatlansagrol-es-bajnai-gordon.
15 ‘Hungary Receives Rescue Package, with Strings Attached’, The Guardian (29 October 2008), www.theguardian.com/business/2008/oct/29/hungary-economy-imf-eu-world-bank.
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17 ‘Hungary’s Fidesz Wins Historic Two-thirds Mandate’, Reuters (25 April 2010), www.reuters.com/article/world/hungarys-fidesz-wins-historic-two-thirds-mandate-idUSTRE63O1KI/.
18 ‘Revolution in the Polling Booths’, Magyarország Miniszterelnöke (26 April 2010), https://2010-2015.miniszterelnok.hu/in_english_ article/revolution_in_the_polling_booths.
19 ‘GDP per Capita Growth (Annual %)—Hungary, Slovak Republic, Czechia, Romania, Poland’, The World Bank, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.KD.ZG?end=2010&locations=HU-SK-CZ-RO-PL&start=2002, accessed 16 November 2024.
20 ‘Hungary National Debt’, Countryeconomy.com, https://countryeconomy.com/national-debt/hungary?year=2024, accessed 11 November 2024.
21 ‘Brutális különadókat vet ki a kormány’ (The Government Is Imposing Brutal Special Taxes), Portfolio (27 December 2010), www.portfolio.hu/bank/20101227/brutalis-kulonadokat-vet-ki-a-kormany-top-10-sztori-2010-ben-5-143283.
22 ‘Elfogadták a kettős állampolgárságot’ (Dual Citizen-ship Has Been Accepted), Index (26 May 2010), https://index.hu/belfold/2010/05/26/elfogad-tak_a_kettos_allampolgarsagot/?token=8916de0b- 136690f60289efabbb7d0292.
23 ‘Orbán Viktor teljes beszéde’ (Viktor Orbán’s Complete Speech), Magyar Nemzet (29 July 2014), https://magyarnemzet.hu/archivum/belfold-archivum/orban-viktor-teljes-beszede-2-4054256/.
24 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs (1 November 1997), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/1997-11-01/rise-illiberal-democracy.
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