An Alternative to Demographic Ostrich Policies

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‘On average, women are having one less child today than they were having in 1990...A country's population size is being sustained when its total fertility rate reaches 2.1, but more than half of the world's countries are below this level...In parallel with depopulation, life expectancy is on the increase, resulting in a major transformation of the age structure of societies.’

Europe has faced many challenges over the decades, out of which one of the most important in the long term being the demographic crisis. And yet there is no consensus among politicians or experts as to whether there is a even crisis or not.

However, if we look at the demographic transition in Europe, we can see that fertility is generally below the critical level required to reproduce the population. In 2023, for instance, the average total fertility rate was 1.38.

Are Demographic Problems Really Just Europe’s Problem?

It would be a mistake, however, to see this as a problem that only affects the ageing Old Continent. The global demographic situation is set to change significantly. According to the 2024 edition of the UN’s biennially published World Population Prospects, there is a high probability of around 80 per cent that the global population will peak in the 21st century and then go into gradual decline. The forecast predicts that the number of people will increase from 8.2 billion in 2024 to 10.3 billion in 2080, before changing course and falling to 10.2 billion by the end of the century. According to the latest report, prosperity, falling birth rates and the global trend of longer life expectancy will reduce the world’s population by 700 million or 6 per cent by the end of the century, compared to what was expected a decade ago.

This is a significant change from the projection published in 2013, when the estimated probability of global population growth stalling in the 21st century was only around 30 per cent. Based on UN estimates, the world’s countries can be divided into three groups: the first group includes those whose population growth is expected to peak before 2024; the population of those in the second group are expected to peak sometime between 2025 and 2054; while the third group of countries faces lower to higher intensity population growth and a likely peak at the end of the century or just after.

Another important change is that, on average, women are having one less child today than they were having in 1990, as the global fertility rate then was around 3.31, while almost a quarter of a century later it has declined to roughly 2.25. A country’s population size is being sustained when its total fertility rate reaches 2.1, but more than half of the world’s countries are below this level. The situation is further compounded by the fact that by 2030, in the countries that face depopulation, half of the females will be too old to conceive naturally. In parallel with depopulation, life expectancy is on the increase, resulting in a major transformation of the age structure of societies. By the end of the 2070s, the number of people aged 65 and over is expected to reach 2.2 billion worldwide, outnumbering children (under 18).

‘In parallel with depopulation, life expectancy is on the increase, resulting in a major transformation of the age structure of societies’

In Europe, we see significant regional differences in both fertility data and government attempts to find solutions. Two distinctive strands can be recognized in the philosophy of applied policy, based on the extent to which family and population policy can be seen as important in avoiding a demographic winter. However, the dilemma of the demographic crisis is more of a trilemma, as the British demographer Paul Morland points out. The demographic trilemma, or the impossible trinity, describes a law that states that a country cannot have low fertility, cultural or ethnic homogeneity, and economic prosperity at the same time. For example, if a country like Japan has a low total fertility rate and rejects mass immigration, it will face an increasingly poor old-age dependency ratio and severe economic challenges. If a country has a persistently low female fertility rate, mass immigration is the main way to keep the dependency ratio low, but this can only be a temporary solution. Only with high birth rates can a nation achieve a dynamic economy and avoid dependence on immigration.

Let us also reflect briefly on popular beliefs. The argument of extreme anti-natalists that a complete denial of having children will save the planet from a major climate catastrophe ignores the fact that it is the development of technology that can help avoid disasters in the first place. But technological progress requires innovation driven by young people. If there are not enough children, there will not be enough young talents to develop clean technologies. Another widely held belief concerns the path that many Western European countries are taking, that is, a policy of mass immigration. However, this can only increase fertility and reduce labour shortage in the short term: if we look at global demographic trends, we see on the one hand that the total fertility rate in the countries of origin is falling or will soon start to fall, and on the other hand, that the propensity to have children of those immigrating is lower in the receiving country than in the country of origin (even if it is still higher there than of those originally in the receiving country). In other words, a country’s economic recovery will continue to depend heavily on immigration, which is unpredictable in many ways. Another solution is to rely on artificial intelligence to solve demographic problems. However, technology is not yet ready to completely replace human resources, even in the most developed countries, while we are already seeing population decline in less developed countries.

‘The demographic trilemma…describes a law that states that a country cannot have low fertility, cultural or ethnic homogeneity, and economic prosperity at the same time’

After 2010 the Hungarian government responded to demographic concerns by building a new family support system instead of mass immigration when it decided to put families with children at the centre of its vision. As a result, family policy and the promotion of childbearing and child rearing have been particularly emphasized in Hungary since 2010, and the Hungarian government has developed a complex family policy system that includes a number of concrete measures.

And finally, let us look a little further into the future. The way in which Europe’s national governments respond to demographic challenges will have a long-term impact on societies. It is, therefore, of utmost importance to be aware of how members of society think about these issues. The Values Under Siege survey conducted by the Youth Research Institute in 2022 examined value orientations in five European countries: Hungary, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and Italy. The block on society’s values included questions such as how citizens feel about efforts to change society and what methods would be appropriate to tackle certain social problems. The first question is also fascinating because it concerns the consequences of mass immigration. The data reveal that compared to the average, Hungarians are significantly less likely to think that society should be changed in a radical, revolutionary way, and significantly more likely to think that it should be protected from any subversive forces.

As far as responses to social challenges are concerned, the European countries in the survey agree, despite minor differences of opinion, that demographic problems should be solved by having children (61 per cent) rather than through immigration (24 per cent).


Read more on Hungarian family policy:

Tackling Demographic Crisis Needs Collective Societal Rejuvenation
Fighting a Bleak Future? — Hungary’s Response to Demographic Challenges
‘On average, women are having one less child today than they were having in 1990...A country's population size is being sustained when its total fertility rate reaches 2.1, but more than half of the world's countries are below this level...In parallel with depopulation, life expectancy is on the increase, resulting in a major transformation of the age structure of societies.’

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