The name of the first President of the European Commission, Walter Hallstein, rarely features in discussions of the bloc’s current affairs. The German bureaucrat, beyond being able to lay claim to the primogeniture of the title, was one of the most important figures in the early years of the European Economic Community. In recent decades, Hallstein’s legacy was overshadowed by that of more recent political titans such as Jacques Delors. Nevertheless, many of Hallstein’s thoughts and views on the European project, despite preceding us by almost seven decades, remain remarkably accurate and relevant to decision-makers, although, sadly, largely forgotten. This is particularly true in regard to agricultural policy, and the role of agriculture in Europe’s political life, social structure, and cultural-civilisational perpetuation and development. His was a typical Western European Christian Democratic worldview: structured by religious and historical tradition; driven by political and economic calculations; and permeated by that overbearing Cold War mentality that engulfed every last aspect of policy and politics on both sides of the Iron Curtain.
The Common Agricultural Policy, established during Hallstein’s presidency, remains one of his most enduring legacies, having provided a lifeline for generations of European farmers. In a speech justifying the creation of the CAP delivered at the picturesque Northern Italian town of Stresa, by the shore of the Lago Maggiore lake, Hallstein spoke less of numbers, and more of the pillars of European civilisation. Addressing dignitaries from the six founding Member States of the EEC, Hallstein expressed his wish for long-term cooperation in the sector, emphasising its uniqueness and outsized role in European economies and societies. His assessment of the importance of the preservation of rural life, and of a vibrant agricultural sector, was combined with a concern over rapid urbanisation and the potential political-cultural consequences thereof. Hallstein decried the erroneous idea, still widely held, that the status of a farmer is culturally inferior, and hoped that the rapid urbanization of Europe would be balanced out by some outbound migration from the cities—something that did not happen.
‘The Common Agricultural Policy, established during Hallstein’s presidency, remains one of his most enduring legacies’
Perhaps the two most remarkable—and least remembered—passages of Hallstein’s landmark speech are those in which he leaves the numbers and procedural complexities aside to delve into the intricacies of existence as a farmer in post-War Europe. When mentioning urbanization and the unaddressed negative effects of the modernisation of agriculture, Hallstein speaks of the values which are common to the European farming community—the freedom and independence which come from farming one’s own holding —that cannot be expressed in terms of income. In his concluding remarks, Hallstein paints a tragic picture of world affairs that he calls ‘a tragedy of freedom’ and warns of the risks of Europe being completely eliminated amidst the dispute between the two Great Powers. This was a trying time politically, bringing with it a threat to the very essence of what Europe has created, a civilization based upon the inalienable freedom and dignity of the human personality.
The agricultural community, according to Hallstein, was particularly susceptible to such threats, and, as such, its protection and uplifting by the emerging Community should be regarded as being of paramount importance. The wealth brought by the European farmer was greater than his crops, or the lire or Deutschemarks that could be earned from trading therein. For Hallstein, the farming community was both the mainstay of our European Common market and a foundational pillar of Europe as a civilization, being at once a receptacle and a guarantor of its core values. Hallstein concludes his speech in true mid-century Christian democratic fashion by once again emphasising the value of European farmers, morally, socially, and in human terms and their obstinate traditionalism, which could pose challenges for the inevitable reforms that would follow the nascent CAP. Reminding his peers of their own, close or remote, farming origins, Hallstein once again pledges to work in favour of the sector.
One is constantly reminded of Hallstein’s speech when analysing the turbulences of the recent years in Europe’s fields and countryside towns, occasionally bringing the distinct view of columns of tractors and piles of hay to the polished streets and thoroughfares of European capitals. And, out of the several farmers’ movements that have swept the EU since 2022, few dialogue so much with Hallstein—although, perhaps, unaware of it—as the Polish one. For several months 2024, farmers, joined by truckers’ unions, blockaded the Polish–Ukrainian border, significantly slowing the passage of all but emergency and military vehicles. The organisations vowed to maintain the blockade until their demands were heard and met. For farmers, this translated into guarantees that the Polish agricultural sector would be duly protected against what they perceived as an unprecedented invasion by Ukrainian products. A deal was eventually reached in the Ukrainian dossier, but the announcement of a preliminary agreement of the EU–Mercosur Free Trade Agreement on the 6th of December by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, during a trip to Montevideo, gave renewed impetus to the movement. In the palaces of government, Poland prepared to take over the Presidency of the Council of the EU, and a crucial vote by the Member States on the most consequential trade agreement for the European agricultural sector approached. In the streets of Warsaw and in several countryside towns, farmers took to the streets to defend those invaluable Hallsteinian values—and their own sector’s continuity as it is.
Solidarity in Protest
If France is the traditional enfant terrible of EU trade policy, Poland is firmly establishing itself as its steadfast counterpart in the Eastern half of the Union. During the past decade, Poland became the focal point of the Central and Eastern European farmers’ movement, spearheading resistance to several Green Deal- and trade-related measures that negatively impact the sector. Polish farmers have a long history of organization, protest, and quarrels with the government, dating back to Communist times. One of the largest farmers’ unions in the country, known in English as Rural Solidarity, is the agrarian wing of the legendary Catholic-inspired trade union movement led by former President Lech Walesa, which was at the forefront of the mass movement that would eventually bring down the regime and restore democratic rule in the country. Its participation in the broader Solidarity movement, while often overlooked by international analysts, was crucial, and has contributed to its lingering influence amongst Polish farmers, and for the creation of a strong protest culture in the sector.
Rural Solidarity is known for its conservative profile, retaining a historically strong proximity with both the Catholic Church and its hierarchy since its foundation in 1980, which was both supported by the clergy and strongly influenced by Catholic social teaching, under the influence of, inter alia, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński. Since the 2010s the union has enjoyed mostly positive relations with Poland’s conservative opposition Law and Justice (PiS) party, traditionally more popular in the countryside. It is, perhaps, no coincidence that two of the past three presidents of Rural Solidarity have also been politicians, elected on PiS lists. The union remains, however, non-partisan, and is at the forefront of dialogue with the present, liberal-centrist government of Prime Minister Donald Tusk. Although it remains the largest agrarian union in Poland, in recent years it was joined by a blooming galaxy of likeminded organizations, united by staunch agrarianism and an overall distrust of EU policymaking and, increasingly, of the Tusk government. These organizations were at the forefront of the large-scale protests and blockades that took place last year at Poland’s Eastern border in opposition to EU-initiated trade liberalization measures with Ukraine.
While the measures were ultimately approved, pressure from agrarian unions across Europe led national governments to demand ulterior safeguard measures on certain products, such as poultry and eggs. In Poland the blockades forced the government to negotiate with farmers’ unions and truckers’ representatives. The resulting compromise saw Tusk, one of the strongest backers of Ukraine’s war effort in Europe, defend a much more restrictive approach to the trade liberalization measures than that proposed by Brussels. The success of the farmers’ protests in a country where support for Ukraine is a near-unanimity in the political and cultural spheres—including amongst the farmers themselves—attests to the broad support of the sector among the Polish population. More importantly, however, it laid bare one of the main structural fractures in the country’s centrist ruling coalition.
The Polish farmers’ movement was bolstered by its success with the Ukrainian dossier and by the renewed leverage of similar agrarian movements across the continent, even when facing less sympathetic interlocutors in the corridors of power. It comes, thus, as no surprise that the 6 December announcement was received with verbal protests and the promise of further street resistance by Rural Solidarity and other leading agrarian associations. Days before the announcement, a large-scale warning protest against the Mercosur deal was held across the country.
‘The Polish farmers’ movement was bolstered by its success with the Ukrainian dossier and by the renewed leverage of similar agrarian movements across the continent’
The Polish government, aware of its internal dynamics and wary of a repeat of the large-scale protests of 2024, announced its opposition to the Agreement as it stands, vowing to join France in the ‘No’ camp in the upcoming Council vote.
Tipping the Scales
Tusk was only able to return to power in 2023 after forming a heterogeneous coalition composed of two centrist groupings (Tusk’s Civic Coalition and Szymon Hołownia’s Poland 2050 party), the left-wing New Left party, and the centre-right agrarianist Polish People’s Party (PSL). The PSL is a farmers’ party, socially conservative and historically close to Rural Solidarity, which relies essentially on rural voters. Its participation in a coalition perceived as hostile to that very category could be fatal to the party in the long term, something that farmers’ organizations are well-aware of. Concurrently, given Tusk’s razor-thin majority in the Sejm, support from the PSL’s 28 MPs is fundamental for the coalition’s survival. Crossing any red lines of the PSL, especially on agrarian policies, may quickly become fatal for the entire government.
Should the Mercosur agreement be approved by the Council, however, the ruling coalition is likely to face backlash from farmers’ organizations despite its own negative vote. Farmers’ unions have called for large-scale protests to be held in Warsaw on the 3rd of January against the Mercosur agreement and other EU- and government-initiated measures. In its own communiqué, Rural Solidarity referred to the agreement as ‘EU madness’, and emphasized the importance of the protests’ scope, portraying them as a rallying cry against Brussels-initiated, and government-supported, measures that go against the interests of Polish farmers, and of the Polish nation as a whole. The chosen date is not accidental, either, as it coincides with a visit by von der Leyen to Warsaw. For farmers and rural unions, von der Leyen is a personification of both the Green Deal and of Brussels’ relentless advocacy for the Mercosur agreement. For Eurosceptics, in which the Polish opposition abounds (sadly, not without good reason), the Commission President is a personification of the bloc’s faults.
It remains too early to affirm that the Mercosur agreement will lead to any major shifts in rural support for Tusk’s coalition. Nevertheless, there are increasing signs that a more significant break may be on the horizon. The adoption of ever-more hostile rhetoric towards the EU by Rural Solidarity and other farmers’ organisations signals a shift towards a starker Euroscepticism amongst those groups. Although Polish farmers’ organization were never known for their enthusiasm towards Brussels, an explicit break with the Tusk government over European policies is an outcome the prime minister would be keen to avoid. One of the main narrative strengths of the present ruling coalition is its capacity to present itself as a broad front, composed of ideologically diverse forces united in favour of a national interest of reconciliation with the West and the idea of the reinsertion of Poland into the heart of the EU.
This broad front was as much a political strategy by Tusk as it was a necessity, as otherwise a majority in the Sejm would be beyond reach. A rupture with farmers’ organizations, although problematic for all parties, would be fatal to the PSL. The party’s leadership would be hard-pressed to either obtain major concessions from its coalition partners in topics beyond solely agriculture, as a political show of strength; and in agri-food policy, to pursue a rapprochement with farmers’ organisations and ensure its own survival as a ‘peasants’ party’. Failure to do so in the short term would bode ill for the PSL, and especially for its leader, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Defence Władysław Kosiniak-Kamysz, at which point the risks of an exit from the ruling coalition might prove more appealing for the party than the costs of remaining.
Hallsteinian Reminiscences
The fact that such a rupture seems to approach as Poland takes over the presidency of the Council adds to the internal tensions, and further increases the PSL’s leverage on the government’s position on Mercosur. Concurrently, the sight of a Council of the EU under the Polish presidency putting its signature onto the agreement could quickly put the party between the Scylla of remaining in the coalition and the Charybdis of standing with its core electorate. Tusk, known for his political acumen in coalition-building at home and in Europe, is unlikely to risk either the survival of his coalition or a debacle for his party in a Presidential election. Ironically, as it often is in politics, in the case of Mercosur, the lukewarmth of Rural Solidarity’s ties of late with the PSL may turn out to be its greatest asset in opposing the agreement. The dilemma faced by the Polish government echoes that of many of its counterparts that rely on the support of either agrarianist parties or conservative parties with a strong rural base: is it worth pursuing a large-scale trade agreement if it risks harming national agriculture? Opposing the numbers that often favour the first route are the fields and the and farmers who have worked them, generation after generation, and whose wealth, as Hallstein stated in 1958, ‘cannot be measured in terms of income’. This dilemma is evermore present in the EU as the bloc refocuses its priorities in agri-food policy from dogmatic environmentalism to a more pragmatic mélange of 2010s green ideas and classic concerns over food security and sovereignty.
It is almost certain that neither Rural Solidarity, nor its allied organizations, or the PSL itself take inspiration from Hallstein’s now obscure words pronounced at Stresa nearly 67 years ago. Nevertheless, the speech looms large over the developments of the past year. The former’s approach to the EU has hardened, as the bloc itself showed itself more distant to the plight of farmers and, if anything, willing to contribute to its intensification—at least until last year’s protests and elections. There remains an underlying feeling, in 2024 as in 1958, that policies, especially in liberal-leaning governments, are done in the cities and for the cities, with farmers still relegated to the status Hallstein warned against. Neither movement is explicitly Eurosceptic. For any farmers’ movement, opposition to the EU only goes so far as opposing certain policies or political personalities, without directly questioning membership in the bloc, as the CAP remains a strictly European policy. Furthermore, Poland is one of the most pro-European countries in the bloc, with nearly 80 per cent of the country’s population supporting EU membership. What they do criticize, however, is the bloc’s aloofness and detachment from the realities of the farming sector in its formulation of policies ranging from the environment to trade. The decades-long European mission to uplift the farming sector appeared to wane, and the farmers, the mainstay of the European common market, took to the streets.
‘Poland is one of the most pro-European countries in the bloc, with nearly 80 per cent of the country’s population supporting EU membership’
Upon reflection, the most accurate way to describe the recent evolution of the Polish farmers’ movement and its approach towards the EU in general and trade policy in particular is that it is involuntarily ‘Hallsteinian’. The discourse of associations such as Rural Solidarity and, to a certain extent, parties such as PSL and PiS, presents the countryside and the Polish farmer similarly to how Hallstein depicted the mid-century European farmer. The ideal Polish farmer is not only a mainstay of the national economy. He is a stalwart of tradition and values, a custodian of an older cultural, even civilizational model. If in the 1950s this was a quintessentially Christian democratic idea, in the 2020s it is a markedly conservative one. It would be simplistic to equate agrarianism with social conservatism, or to assume that the vision of the farmer imagined by certain political discourses corresponds to the reality. It is equally simplistic and equivocated, however, to disregard European agriculture as a sector as fundamental to the continent in 2024 as it was in 1958, and to sacrifice the continent’s farming sector on the altar of environmentalism or free trade. This does not mean that free trade agreements ought not to be pursued, nor that the specific EU-Mercosur Agreement should be discarded. What is needed is, rather, a reorientation of European and national-level policies not only in a more pro-farmer direction, but also one that elevates the moral, social, and human aspects of agricultural communities to the same level of importance as their economic concerns. In nuce, a return to a Hallsteinian understanding of agri-food policy, which prioritizes food security, and the preservation of farmers’ communities and of farming as an activity.
The restoration of the old Christian democratic understanding of farming communities as pillars of European society is a needed first step. The Polish government seems to have taken heed of it for now, if not by its own will, by the strength of its farmers and the pressure of the PSL. The conservative opposition, long established in the countryside, is well-aware of it. For now, the coalition appears stable. This is a fragile equilibrium, however, as the lingering contradictions between the farmers’ movement and the Tusk government are bound to resurface. The PSL will find itself in ever more difficult positions, as, paradoxically, Rural Solidarity and the rest of the farmers’ movement becomes more assertive. Concurrently, this would provide PiS with a valuable opportunity to regain much of its countryside electorate that had abandoned the party in the last election, as well as sympathetic urban voters. In Poland, as in the rest of Europe, Hallstein’s words linger on, nearly seven decades later. All of Europe is Stresa.
