Waka Ikeda is a Tokyo-based freelance journalist who writes for Nikkei Asia, Newsweek, and The Japan Times, among others. She has been covering Hungary’s unique family policy strategy for several years. Konohana recently visited Hungary to gain deeper insight into these initiatives as part of her research for an upcoming book on Japanese and Hungarian family policies. She sat down with Hungarian Conservative to discuss Japan’s increasingly urgent demographic crisis and explore potential solutions.

***

The main purpose of your visit to Hungary is to gain a deeper understanding of Hungarian family policy. After spending a month here, how do you assess these policies? And in your view, what are the main differences compared to those in Japan?

I’ve actually been writing about Hungary’s family policies for about a year and a half. I’ve published around eight articles in The Japan Times, Newsweek, and other Japanese media, both in English and Japanese. I find Hungarian family policy fascinating, mainly because it’s so different from Japan’s. The focus here is on young people, which is completely lacking in Japan.

The areas where the Japanese government falls short include but are not exclusive to: youth support, housing assistance, work-life balance, gender equality, and the wellbeing of parents and children. Japan’s family policy only includes limited child support. For example, monthly child allowance is around 15,000 yen, which is approximately 37,000 forints per child. From the third child onward, it doubles—but people won’t decide to have a baby just for a small amount of money. There are no housing subsidies either.

In contrast, Hungary exempts people under the age of 25 from income tax, which I think is amazing. I love most of the measures I’ve seen here, especially those focusing on young people and grandparents. Hungary even offers maternity and parental leave for grandparents, which I found very unique—I’ve never heard of that in any other country.

However, there are also some distinct Japanese initiatives, such as the four-day workweek policy announced by the government last December...

Yes, but I want to clarify that it hasn’t been codified into law. The government is just encouraging companies to try it, but it’s not mandatory. They are starting a pilot in April this year for national public servants, and some municipalities and city halls might follow later, probably starting with Tokyo since everything tends to begin there.

A few large companies like Microsoft, Uniqlo, and Sagawa Takkyubin—a logistics company—have begun implementing it. However, there has been criticism. In some cases, employees who work four days a week get paid less than those who work five. For example, people with two jobs might switch to four-day workweeks but are forced to work longer hours or more overtime to make up for the lost income.

So it basically means that the initiative hasn’t served its intended purpose of improving work-life balance?

It might offer some flexibility, and I wouldn’t say it’s entirely negative, but without regulation, it's unclear whether it will have a real, sustain and lasting impact. Unless the government mandates that employees working four days should still receive full pay, or introduces other strong protections, companies won’t follow through. Especially with the current labour shortage in Japan, I doubt many businesses would adopt this voluntarily—and only large companies might even be able to afford it.

What could be the broader reasons behind these differences between the Japanese and the Hungarian approach?

I think it’s mainly political and demographic. Japan has what I call a ‘silver democracy’—most voters are over 65. Because of the imbalance in political representation—especially the lack of women in decision-making roles—policy is skewed toward older people.

Tax revenues are primarily allocated to benefit the elderly, not to support youth or make education more affordable. For instance, Tokyo recently introduced subsidies of around 3,000 euro per year so that many students can attend high school for free. But Tokyo is exceptionally wealthy; this isn’t the national norm. The political class knows that the elderly are living comfortably at the expense of younger generations. Politicians even acknowledge this privately, saying that “they are stealing the future of the youth.” As a result, little or nothing is done to change the status quo.

‘Intense academic pressure hinders social development, interpersonal skills, and family time’

There are also social and cultural reasons. I’ve written about this in Nikkei Asia recently—East Asian societies are deeply rooted in academic credentialism. Your university determines the rest of your life. That means children must start preparing for elite schools very early. Around 40 per cent of elementary school students attend after-school cram schools.

This intense academic pressure hinders social development, interpersonal skills, and family time. As a result, many young Japanese lack meaningful human connection. We’ve become what I call a ‘solo society’. There are even restaurants designed for people to dine alone in booths with partitions. Many young people today prefer solitude over social interaction. That’s a major difference compared to Hungary.

So reversing demographic decline in Japan would require a complete societal shift?

Yes, exactly. Japan needs to stop viewing children as an economic or psychological burden and start seeing them as a value. But changing this mindset is extremely difficult.

One thing I found interesting in Hungary is the ‘family value’ education programmes. Moreover, Hungary promotes human connection and even sex positivity in its educational programmes. In Japan, sex education is extremely limited. It focuses only on risks like STDs and sexual violence—there’s nothing about relationships, intimacy, family, or human connection.

I think Japan could benefit from something broader—not necessarily called ‘sex education’ or ‘family policy’—but rather ‘human education’ that includes gender equality, sex positivity, emotional wellbeing, and relationships. Japan has one of the worst gender pay gaps in the developed world: 21 per cent. South Korea is worse at around 30 per cent. Obviously, gender education is also badly needed.

You mentioned that a lack of social interaction is becoming a serious issue in Japan. But we’ve seen similar problems in Western societies too, especially since the 2000s. When did this trend start to appear in Japan?

I think it started in the 1990s. During the 1980s Japan’s economy was still strong, and people could take risks. But when the economic bubble burst, society became more conservative in terms of avoiding risks. Marriage became more of an economic partnership than a romantic one.

Historically, Japan has always been traditional. Before WWII, it was a militaristic society. After the war, under American influence, we became a democracy and saw strong economic growth until the bubble burst in the late 80s.

Since then, people have become extremely risk-averse. That’s similar to what’s happening in South Korea now—after the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Parents tell their children to find a stable job, marry someone dependable, and not take risks. Government jobs are especially popular.

Social media has also made people more insecure. That adds another layer to the isolation we’re seeing among young people.

From a Hungarian perspective, Japanese society often seems quite closed. Realistically speaking, how do you think this mindset could be changed?

It’s incredibly difficult. But Japan has shown it can transform—it went from a feudal society to a militaristic one, and then to a democracy. We achieved rapid economic development in just a few decades. So change is possible.

But first, we must abandon academic credentialism and embrace individual needs in terms of, for exmaple, the diversity of life course. Right now, Japan has a rigid, one-size-fits-all life trajectory: graduate university, start a job through mass hiring, stay at the same company, and retire from there. Gap years are frowned upon. There’s no room for deviation. That has to change.

We need to provide education on gender equality and human rights—not to impose family values, but to promote human connection. Corporate culture also needs a massive overhaul. Right now, exploitative practices are still common. Overtime is considered positive, so base salaries are low, and employees rely on overtime pay to make ends meet.

We also have a two-track employment system: general administrative positions (mostly filled by women) and professional track jobs (usually given to men). The former rarely leads to promotion. Not all companies do this, but many still do. Equal pay for equal work is also lacking. In Japan, where you work determines your salary—not your job title. That limits mobility. Even if you’re an IT engineer, switching companies means starting over.

I'll share my personal experience: I worked in New York for nine years in marketing, but when I returned to Japan because of my then-husband’s relocation, I faced discrimination. I was pregnant, had a baby, and employers asked: ‘Who will take care of your child?’ They didn’t say I was too old directly—but the implication was clear. Things are improving, mostly because of labour shortages, but discrimination still exists.

If the current demographic trends continue, what is the worst-case scenario for Japan?

The worst-case scenario is already being projected. Our population is around 127 million now. By 2050 we’re expected to lose 30 per cent of it. That will affect everything: higher taxes, failing social services, labour shortages.

If you go to rural areas now, you’ll already see it—there are barely any buses, and most taxi drivers are elderly. Even with the current tourism boom due to the weak yen, there aren’t enough people to support it—hotels, restaurants, public transport are all understaffed.

‘Japanese society doesn’t value young people enough’

When I come to Hungary, I’m always amazed by how many young people are in important positions or leading organizations. That’s rare in Japan, where seniority and relationships established over decades is prioritized youth, talent and expertise. Japanese society doesn’t value young people enough

For many of them, it’s a rational decision not to marry or have children. Academic pressure, high costs, lack of social mobility—it’s too much. Japan is a ‘one-shot society’—you don’t get second chances. This must change. Many Japanese politicians blame women for not having children, but women are fertile—Japanese society is not fertile for having families.

You are currently working on a book. Could you share some insights with us regarding its main focus and what motivated you to begin this project?

Yes, of course. The working title is A Country Where Young People Want to Have Children vs. A Country Where They Don’t. I want to compare Hungary and Japan. In Hungary, I’ve met dozens of university students who all said they want to get married and have children. Looking at it from a Japanese perspective, it’s quite unbelievable. In Japan, most young people I speak with hesitate even to think about marriage, let alone having children. The contrast is striking—and it’s one of the main reasons I wanted to explore why Hungary feels so different in this regard.

However, Hungary and Japan are similar—not in their family policies, but in their passive immigration policies, and in the fact that most children are born within marriage. As a result, we can’t just copy policies from Sweden or France—our politicians tend to do it regardless—, which have very different social norms, I think Japan can learn from Hungary. The similarities in values make that comparison more meaningful.

Read more of our interviews: