Will Thibeau is a veteran of the Army’s 75th Ranger Regiment and serves as Director of the American Military Project at the Claremont Institute’s Center for the American Way of Life. The project aims to systematically expose, evaluate, and eliminate the manifestations of wokeness within the personnel, programmes, and policies of the US military. Thibeau recently visited Budapest to take part in a panel discussion at the Central European Summit, jointly organized by the Oeconomus Economic Research Foundation and the Center for Fundamental Rights. During the conference, he sat down with Hungarian Conservative to discuss how wokism and DEI practices have transformed the US Armed Forces—and how Donald Trump’s current purge of such initiatives seeks to address the threats a DEI-based military poses to the nation. The conversation also touched on current global geopolitical challenges and the potential—as well as the obstacles—of deeper US–Hungarian defence cooperation.
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As Director of the American Military Project at the Claremont Institute, you have advocated for the elimination of diversity, equity, and inclusion practices from the ranks of the US military for years, highlighting the serious threats they pose to American national security. What are those threats?
At its core, it means the military becomes a vehicle for a toxic ideology—one that is directly harmful to the American way of life, to traditional values, and to conservatives more broadly.
The military has historically been seen as an institution rooted in conservative values. It has served as a place for the formation of men, for the cultivation of virtue, and for enabling social mobility. But if it is tied to a political ideology, it will begin to favour only certain kind of people, rather than serving the nation as a whole.
There is another dangerous implication: the application of military power itself becomes tied to ideological objectives. We saw this even in Afghanistan, where the war eventually turned into a push to educate Afghan girls—rather than remaining focused on what was vital to American interests.
And finally, this ideological alignment disrupts the American system of governance. Civilian control of the military is fundamental to our republic. But if military leaders in uniform are trained to be paragons of ideology, their allegiance may shift from the chain of command and an accountable civilian government to a political cause. All of these dynamics pose serious threats to the American way of life, and to the way we conduct our interests globally.
When you mention ‘ideology’, I assume you are referring to wokism. Is this ultimately what it all comes down to?
I do think it’s a woke problem, but I also believe there’s more to it. What we’re looking at is an ideological capture that represents a ‘marriage’ between two threats to the American way of life.
One side of that marriage is progressive extreme ideology—the belief that we should have racial preferences based on group characteristics, or that we should prioritize feminism over professionalism. That’s one half.
‘The extent to which DEI has taken over the US military is far greater than most people realize’
The other half is a permanent neoconservative national security state that seeks to perpetuate American military intervention overseas and preserve inflated defence budgets. During the 1960s America went through an intense period of civil rights reform—some of it good—; but overall, it was a deeply progressive era. I believe the military and the national security state recognized this ideological momentum and entered into that marriage as a way to ensure they stayed in power.
They made a bet that the political climate of that era would continue indefinitely. And now, I think, that long moment may be coming to an end. But we must fight both sides of that marriage.
And that fight is currently being led by Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth, who heads a task force charged with eliminating diversity, equity, and inclusion offices and initiatives, with a final report due no later than 1 June. But is that timeframe sufficient to reverse such a consequential and long-standing practice?
They’re currently conducting an initial review of how DEI has been addressed in the early days of the administration. However, I don’t think there’s any doubt that they will need to continue beyond June—both in terms of holding military officers accountable and ensuring that what we call ideological mission creep does not return.
The extent to which DEI has taken over the US military is far greater than most people realize. It’s going to take four, perhaps even eight years of consistent effort to ensure the institution remains free from ideological capture. More specifically, the leaders we promote within the military must not be favourable toward this kind of ideology.
This is not a recent development; it has been ongoing since the 1960s, when generals and admirals began to operate increasingly as political operatives. We are therefore looking at two generations of military leadership that need to be addressed to prevent this from happening again. So yes, it will definitely take longer than just a few months—it will take us well past June.
Critics, however, argue that it is the recent changes themselves, and not DEI that pose a threat to national security.
Well, I would return to what I said earlier—that purging DEI from the military is indeed a threat, but specifically to the traditional way of doing business within the US national security establishment. What emerged over time was a mutually beneficial relationship, in which the national security state supported DEI and other liberal ideologies, and those ideologies, in turn, reinforced the authority and legitimacy of the national security state.
This became particularly evident during the war in Ukraine. Democrats and liberals—many of whom were once, quite rightly, opposed to American military intervention in Iraq—suddenly became strong advocates of aggressive US involvement in Ukraine. So to that extent, they are probably correct.
‘The military is now able to focus more directly on serving the American people and advancing President Trump’s foreign policy agenda’
What I do not agree with—and what is clearly untrue—is the notion that our military, or the nation more broadly, is now weaker. On the contrary, the military is now able to focus more directly on serving the American people and advancing President Trump’s foreign policy agenda.
Rather than being absorbed into an all-encompassing foreign policy establishment—what we often refer to as the blob—, the military can once again operate as an institution of lethal force, judiciously and rightfully applied when American interests are at stake.
And, according to the Trump administration, American interests are clearly at stake, as US hegemony is increasingly challenged by the rise of China. In addition to the ongoing trade tensions, the looming threat of a military confrontation over Taiwan remains ever-present. How do you see this situation—could the escalation reach the level of an armed conflict, and if so, how might it unfold?
The Trump administration clearly views China as an adversary—both economically and militarily. I would like to think there’s a path to peace, some future compromise, but frankly, I’m not sure.
In many ways, this could also present another bargain—a renewed agreement between conservatives and the military establishment, where the military is reoriented toward deterring, and if necessary, fighting China. And in return, the military is no longer an institution of woke ideology. But again, we’re looking at two possible scenarios.
The first is that China rushes to invade Taiwan. In that case, the United States would likely respond—whether by proxy or directly—to defend Taiwan and physically attrit Chinese forces. That would effectively mean war.
The second scenario, which I hope is already beginning to unfold, is that the US, through a combination of economic, diplomatic, and military efforts, accelerates the formation of a bipolar world order. In this world, our allies in the Pacific—and even in Central Europe—will be compelled to choose: China or the US. That includes Russia, too, frankly.
The goal would be to squeeze and isolate China so that even if they do take Taiwan, there are sufficient economic and military redundancies in place to limit their sphere of influence and insulate the United States from the strategic and economic fallout of the CCP formally overtaking Taiwan.
I believe those are the two scenarios. And I do think China is going to make a move on Taiwan—it’s only a matter of what conditions the United States can set in the intro.
I’m glad you've mentioned that Russia must also choose a side in the second scenario, as many overlook the fact that current US–Russia talks are inevitable for Washington to maintain its global power. The United States cannot afford a close Russian–Chinese partnership in the present circumstances.
And I’ll add this—I don’t believe Russia and China are natural allies. Culturally and geopolitically, they diverge. Even over the past year, we’ve seen China encroach on Russian territory—they built a port in the far northeast that Russia isn’t happy about.
And China has supplied both sides in the war in Ukraine. So there’s clearly space for a strategic opening. Frankly, that’s the scenario I hope transpires—because I don’t want Americans to die over Taiwan.
And when it comes to the war in Ukraine—do you believe a ceasefire could be possible in the near future?
Yes, I do believe a ceasefire in Ukraine is possible. But realistically, it will take a grand bargain—a broader agreement that makes peace not only possible, but sustainable. Russia will require strong assurances that NATO will not infringe upon what it perceives as its territorial sovereignty. Ukraine, of course, wants territorial integrity and peace, but on its terms—without a permanent Russian threat looming over it.
The situation is very fragile. On the battlefield, Ukraine is in a bad state. And it’s clear there is not going to be an escalatory or sustained increase in US investment or military support.
‘Trump is going to push Russia to a deal’
But, you know, I do think Trump is going to push Russia to a deal. I think it has to happen by June, maybe July. But it’s possible. Frankly, it must happen if the US wants to reorient—close deals in the Middle East and Europe—and focus on the Pacific. And they’ll work to do that.
In his keynote speech today, US Chargé d’Affaires in Hungary Robert Palladino also identified the restoration of security and the strengthening of defence and deterrence as key priorities in the Trump administration’s Central Europe policy. Could this signal deeper military cooperation between Hungary and the United States as well?
There are clearly strong and necessary cultural ties that make the United States and Hungary natural allies. However, I would offer a word of caution regarding the long-term viability of the partnership if Hungary continues to maintain such deep economic and security ties with China.
I believe we are entering a period—certainly by this time next year—when the choice between China and the United States will be on the table. And I do think Hungary will ultimately have to choose, in one form or another. The United States will not station troops—peacefully, of course—in a country where the Chinese maintain a security relationship and presence, and perhaps even a significant economic role. That, in my view, is the real dividing line: how long Hungary believes it can sustain parallel relationships with both China and the United States.
In the past, I think the United States was sympathetic when Hungary had to choose between the Biden administration and the Chinese Communist Party. But now the choice is clear: it is between the Chinese Communist Party and the Trump administration. And while I believe there is a real opportunity for a strong alliance—potentially one of the strongest in Europe—, it is not without risks, and it is by no means guaranteed.
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