The date of 28 February 2025 will go down as a defining geopolitical moment. In the Oval Office, a frank exchange took place between US President Donald Trump and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy. Trump, never one to mince words, made it clear that the days of open-ended American support were limited. He admonished Zelenskyy for risking a broader conflict and reminded him of the extent of US aid already provided. Zelenskyy, clearly startled, seemed unprepared for this more pragmatic American stance. Yet the significance of this episode goes far beyond US–Ukrainian relations. Once again, it exposes the longstanding illusions of German foreign policy—a policy that, for decades, has struggled to adjust to the new realities of power politics.
While the current US administration has acknowledged that Ukraine is neither militarily nor economically capable of overpowering Russia in a prolonged conflict, Berlin still regards Western involvement in Ukraine as a success. From the outset, however, Western analysis significantly underestimated Russia’s capacity for resilience. Despite widespread sanctions, Russia’s economy has stabilized and, in some sectors, consolidated. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) now projects growth for Russia, contradicting the assumption that sanctions alone would cause lasting damage. Russia’s pivot to a war economy helped insulate it, while state-led policies appear to have bolstered domestic support for the Kremlin—making an economic collapse increasingly unlikely.
In retrospect, pushing NATO’s reach to Ukraine without robust diplomatic alternatives was a strategic miscalculation—one that might have been avoidable through earlier negotiations. Banking on the idea that Moscow could be forced to retreat solely through economic pressure and military aid to Ukraine was wishful thinking. Successive German governments refused to acknowledge this, as does Chancellor-designate Friedrich Merz today. He clings to the belief that moral arguments and sanctions can decisively sway Russia’s geopolitical calculations. Merz, who presents himself as a geopolitical strategist, dismisses the emerging doubts about the West’s Ukraine strategy—doubts shared not just among realists in Washington but also within other Western governments. Instead of a clear-eyed assessment of power dynamics, Berlin’s political class persists in values-based rhetoric that carries little weight with adversaries.
‘Germany drifts into a self-made moral bubble—earning neither respect nor tangible benefits’
This analytical blind spot is emblematic of a German foreign policy that has favoured moral posturing over long-term strategic interests for years. While nations like China and Russia implement coherent strategies aimed at concrete power objectives, Germany drifts into a self-made moral bubble—earning neither respect nor tangible benefits. Since reunification, Berlin has failed to craft an independent, interest-oriented foreign policy, relying instead on lofty principles without considering real-world ramifications.
The problem is especially evident in relations with Russia. For decades, Germany banked on cheap Russian energy while simultaneously adopting a self-righteous moral tone. The result was a double dependency: economically reliant on Russian imports yet politically boxed in by moral proclamations that allowed no strategic flexibility. When war came to Ukraine’s doorstep, Berlin instinctively turned to sanctions that, ironically, hit German industry harder than the Kremlin. The ensuing economic ripple effects—including the fear of deindustrialization, rising energy prices, and diminished competitiveness—pose a long-term threat to Germany, all while stronger powers like the US and China watch with strategic interest.
Meanwhile, China has executed its foreign policy with far more realism, creating economic dependencies in Africa and Latin America and strategically buying into European industries. Germany, lacking a cohesive strategy, found itself allowing Chinese takeovers of key companies, hoping that appeals to a rules-based order would suffice. Reality tells a different story: Germany has become a pawn in Beijing’s broader geopolitical game—and Berlin has yet to articulate a meaningful response.
A stark example of Germany’s misguided approach also appears in its development aid policy. Instead of safeguarding mutual interests through constructive partnerships, Germany often funds projects that align neither with local needs nor German strategic objectives. For instance, significant sums have been funnelled into expanding rapid cycling routes in Lima, Peru, with the intention of cutting CO₂ emissions and improving local mobility. However, it remains questionable whether such projects genuinely advance Germany’s broader geopolitical position or effectively assist development goals in recipient countries. A more interest-based strategy—such as joint ventures with emerging economies—would likely serve both parties more effectively.
The shortcomings in foreign policy become even clearer in defence. After decades of underinvestment in the Bundeswehr, Germany still lags behind in military readiness. Even after the Ukraine crisis, Berlin’s so-called Zeitenwende (turning point) has lacked substance. The United States has repeatedly insisted that European allies must carry their own weight in defence. Yet Germany has been slow to enact substantial reforms, leaving its armed forces with inadequate equipment and ammunition. This does not bode well for Berlin’s ability to navigate a harsher geopolitical climate.
‘Germany must decide whether to remain on the sidelines of global decision-making or pursue a foreign policy that protects its interests’
It is high time that Germany embarks on a fundamental course correction. Moral principles may guide domestic discourse but cannot be the sole basis of strategic foreign policy. Any recalibration must be grounded in four pillars: First, a diplomatic strategy driven not by moral imperatives but by a sober analysis of national interests. Second, real investment in credible defence capabilities to assume genuine leadership and responsibility within NATO. Third, economic and industrial policies that preserve sovereignty rather than create new vulnerabilities. Fourth, an understanding that alliances, including transatlantic ties, hinge on mutual benefit and tangible contributions.
The encounter between Trump and Zelenskyy should be read as a final warning. The neoconservative era of boundless commitments and nation-building projects has proven unsustainable. The world order is shifting, and those who rely on moralistic appeals without the means to back them up will not fare well. Germany, in particular, must decide whether it wishes to remain on the sidelines of global decision-making or finally pursue a foreign policy that protects its own national interests. The time for illusions is over—only a pragmatic, interest-based approach will secure Germany’s role in the next geopolitical chapter.
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