This article was published in our print edition’s Special Issue on the European Union.

Hungary is set to take over the rotating EU Presidency in July 2024, a development that has provoked mixed feelings among certain political factions. These groups often find themselves struggling to separate substantive arguments from what could be described as baseless criticism or ‘Hungarophobia’.¹ Nonetheless, Hungary has proven to be a formidable participant in these disputes, fully aware of its rights within the EU legal framework and prepared to advocate for them vigorously. Although these debates cover various topics, among the most intense is that between federalists, who envision a more integrated Europe, and sovereigntists, who naturally do not. Historically, the UK been one of the most prominent representatives of the latter viewpoint, a stance that Hungary also notably embodies.

In the middle of May 2023, while strolling along Marsham Street in central London, the catchy melody of Talking Heads’ iconic track ‘Road to Nowhere’ could often be heard from the entrance of the Emmanuel Centre.² Inside, the National Conservatism Conference was underway. On the second day of the conference, as I returned from a coffee break, I unexpectedly encountered Steve Bray, a prominent figure in the anti-Brexit movement. Curious about my intentions, he asked why I was entering the building, cautioning me about the perceived malevolence—‘the evil’ as he perceives it—within. ‘The gathering inside involves consultations on family, national identity, and the future of a post-Brexit UK, particularly from the perspective of the Conservatives’, I responded. Eventually, we started talking, and the conclusion of our ‘intra-conference’ was that family and national identity are certainly to be loved and protected, and Brexit is a regrettable development (as a Hungarian, my opinion is that the European Union must be reformed from the inside, not from the outside, and in this reform process, Hungary lost a serious ally when the British people voted to leave).

Shortly after my farewell to Mr Bray, the award-winning journalist and broadcaster David Campanale turned to me, marking the beginning of another stimulating chat. In contrast to Steve Bray, Mr Campanale, who admittedly frequently attends the annual Hungarian conservative assembly in Tusnádfürdő (Băile Tușnad, Romania)—popularly known as ‘Tusványos’—professed a deep familiarity with Hungary and Hungarian politics. This enabled us have a meaningful conversation ranging from Brexit to post-Brexit UK and Europe, focusing specifically on Hungary’s role within the continent.

Mr Campanale expressed his belief that the Hungarian prime minister’s criticism of the EU was not substantial at all, specifically Orbán’s words that Hungary is only meant to be ‘the grain of sand in the machinery, the stick jammed between the spokes, the splinter under the fingernail’—and no more.³ As someone whose support for the ruling party is rooted in its nuanced and legally sophisticated critique of the EU, I naturally challenged this oversimplified view. I highlighted the structured argumentation underpinning Hungary’s stance, prompting Mr Campanale to wonder why these arguments are not more widely recognized, especially among Europe’s conservatives. Reflecting on our discussion, I have just realized I owe this article to Mr Campanale.

So, let us turn the wheel of time forward, all the way to Orbán’s speech at Tusnádfürdő in 2023. Within a few hours of the prime minister concluding his speech, the Hungarian media was flooded with commentaries. One of the most compelling among those was a report on Telex—a harsh critic of the government—entitled ‘The Resounding Silence between Orbán’s Words’ (A harsogó csönd Orbán szavai közt). The article was centred on a specific moment of Prime Minister Orbán’s speech, the context of which is as follows: ‘Well, we have to say that Europe today has created its own political class, which is no longer accountable and no longer has any Christian or democratic convictions. And we have to say that federalist governance in Europe has led to an unaccountable empire. We have no other choice.’⁴

The author of the article felt palpable tension at this juncture as the audience ‘held their breath’. According to him, the question lingering in the air was whether the Hungarian prime minister was about to declare Hungary’s intention to emulate the UK and exit the European Union. However, the speech took a different track: ‘For all our love of Europe, for all that it is ours, we must fight…We shall not back down. In Europe we shall insist on our rights.’ At this point, the Telex journalist apparently felt a wave of relief, also implying that many others might have shared the same sentiment. In his article, he arrived at the conclusion that Viktor Orbán’s ‘number one’ political legacy lies in his ability to generate tension in 2023 simply by suggesting during his speech that Hungary might ‘ultimately consider opting out of the Western alliance.’⁵

‘Hungary is set to take over the rotating EU Presidency in July 2024, a development that has provoked mixed feelings among certain political factions’

However, it is not the Hungarian prime minister who fosters uncertainty about a ‘Huxit’ scenario, but rather the EU bureaucrats. This stems from the EU’s adoption of a quasi-sanctions approach toward Hungary, based on a one-sided interpretation of the rule of law while giving other countries a pass for various vague political reasons. What is more—although this has received minimal attention in the international media preoccupied with criticizing Hungary—the Hungarian government possesses a well-defined mandate from the Hungarian Parliament regarding its reform proposals for the future of the European Union. It is worth noting that in the meantime, the Hungarian opposition’s narrative is binary: one either fully embraces Euro-federalism or advocates for an immediate exit, whereas both options are seen as unacceptable by a Hungarian conservative like me.

In 2021, in a decision by the Hungarian Parliament, MPs granted the government the authority and obligation to advocate for the political and ideological neutrality of the European Commission, for the democratic reform of the European Parliament, and for financial responsibility across generations. The motion ‘On Hungary’s Position on the Future of the European Union’⁶ outlines twelve key points that offer a blueprint for the EU. If embraced, these guidelines could not only steer the EU back to its abandoned route, but also propel it towards a much-anticipated leap forward. This proposal does not envision a federal Europe; it suggests alternative, more feasible approaches. Read on to discover what these alternatives entail.

‘The objective of an “ever closer union” shall be eliminated from the Treaties. Integration should not be viewed as a final objective but rather as an asset towards achieving a larger purpose: the realization of our national sovereignty.’⁷

‘The European Council’s decision to allow the Commission to launch a 750-billion-euro debt issuance is seen as a ground-breaking political and economic move’

Originally a promising concept, the idea of ever-closer union, embedded in the Treaty of Rome that established the European Community, has been widely misinterpreted over the past fifty-plus years. This principle of fostering greater unity among European nations is a political aim enshrined in the foundational treaties’ texts, making it obligatory. However, the European Commission has misapprehended this fundamental notion. Further compounding the confusion is the staunch support from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), which is tasked with applying and interpreting EU treaties. The CJEU’s decisions, building on one another, are incrementally pushing Europe towards what might seem an exaggerated vision of a unified European state. Such a trajectory could diminish the role and significance of individual member states.

‘Europe’s Christian roots and culture are the basis of European integration, a moral compass in an era of uncertainty. The Treaties must reflect this principle.⁸

Europe’s future identity hinges on its spiritual and cultural direction. Robert Schuman, instrumental in the European Union’s formation, posited in For Europe that democracy must inherently align with Christian principles to avoid degenerating into tyranny or chaos.⁹ This assertion draws from a rich historical context, as illustrated by the EU anthem, which is inspired by Friedrich von Schiller’s 1785 poem and starkly contrasts with the current European political landscape. Schuman suggested that recognizing Christian cultural foundations within EU treaties could mitigate this dissonance. The Hungarian Parliament’s advocacy for subsidiarity—a principle deeply rooted in Christian ethos yet largely overlooked—reflects a broader struggle to maintain these core values within the EU’s governance, emphasizing the ongoing debate around Europe’s spiritual and cultural identity.

‘The Treaties must explicitly settle the European Commission’s political and ideological impartiality.’¹⁰

The European Commission is referred to as ‘the Guardian of the Treaties’—at least, that is what it is supposed to be. This distinguished role comes with significant responsibility. However, under the presidency of Jean-Claude Juncker, the body assumed a distinct political identity, founded on the self-serving interpretation of the goal as one of achieving ever-closer unity among the peoples of Europe. Those who seek political laurels gain friends and foes alike. Yet this is impermissible in a club where all members are supposed to be equal. But who guards the guardians? The EU does not have a clear answer to this question. Therefore, there is only one option left: ensuring the political and ideological neutrality of the European Commission.

‘In the spirit of the principle of subsidiarity, the powers that can be exercised through the institutions of the European Union must be reviewed and recorded in a detailed catalogue.’¹¹

Since the early twentieth century, Europe has been longing for the principle of subsidiarity. In his 1931 social encyclical, Pope Pius XI articulated the view that ‘The supreme authority of the State ought, therefore, to let subordinate groups handle matters and concerns of lesser importance, which would otherwise dissipate its efforts greatly. Thereby the State will more freely, powerfully, and effectively do all those things that belong to it alone because it alone can do them: directing, watching, urging, restraining, as occasion requires and necessity demands.’¹² The EU would not err if it revisited the discussion of competencies solely based on these considerations.

‘Europe must be able to defend itself. Its military capabilities and its underlying industrial capacities must be strengthened, and a common European army must be set up as the guarantor of European security.’¹³

After a significant hiatus, war has resurfaced in Europe. The idea of establishing a joint European army is now within the realm of serious consideration, far from being a taboo subject. The mutual defence clause in the Treaty on the European Union mandates ‘if a Member State is the victim of armed aggression on its territory, the other Member States shall have towards it an obligation of aid and assistance by all the means in their power, in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. This shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defence policy of certain Member States.’¹⁴ Given this, the creation of a unified European army essentially boils down to a question of political resolve.

‘Europe must protect present and future European generations. Addressing the demographic challenge and supporting families should appear as an EU objective in the Treaties.’¹⁵

‘Who the noble prize achieveth /, Good friend of a friend to be; / Who a lovely wife attaineth, / Join us in his jubilee! […] He who in the great ring dwelleth, / Homage pays to sympathy!’¹⁶ This is a quotation from Friedrich Schiller’s ‘Ode to Joy’ (An die Freude), also known as the EU anthem. If the founding treaties of the EU only included this much about family support, then those documents would be more aligned with reality than they currently are—or at least with sentiments in Eastern and Central Europe.

This is because according to ‘Project Europe’,¹⁷ a joint study on families by KINCS and the Századvég Political School Foundation, the overwhelming majority of Europeans also consider family an important value, with 89 per cent of Europeans saying so. According to the results of the survey conducted in 2021, Hungarians are not alone in being among the most family-centric nations in Europe—similarly high rates are to be found in most of the former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, who had the opportunity to experience what it was like when attempts were made to push the family into the background during the years of communism.¹⁸

The survey also found that Hungary has the highest proportion (40 per cent) of those who think that three children are ideal in a family, and similarly to Bulgarians and Slovaks, only 1 per cent can imagine their lives without children. There is also a great deal of consensus about supporting families. According to the results of the survey conducted within the framework of Project Europe, the four Visegrad Group countries (the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, and Slovakia) and other Central and Eastern European states are also committed to strengthening support for families.

‘Amendments to the Treaty must guarantee each nation’s sovereign right to choose who resides within its borders.’¹⁹

Mark Higgie, in his article published in the Hungarian Review, discusses the evolution and challenges of multiculturalism in the context of the Christian West’s interaction with non-Western immigrants. He outlines how the initial concept of multiculturalism, which was about allowing immigrants to continue their cultural practices within the boundaries of the host nation’s laws and values, has shifted. This shift has been towards a more liberal interpretation where not fully embracing an immigrant’s cultural practices is often viewed as racism. Higgie notes a tension between upholding traditional Western values and being overly cautious not to offend non-Western immigrants, leading to various forms of self-censorship and policy changes in Western countries. Despite these challenges, Higgie argues that it is not impossible to manage immigration effectively, citing examples from Italy, Hungary, and Australia. He emphasizes Australia’s approach to migration, which is based on strong borders and a selective welcoming of immigrants who can contribute positively to society. According to Higgie, such policies can reassure citizens and pave the way for more harmonious relations between Western countries’ native populations and non-Western immigrants.²⁰

‘Ensuring the well-being of future generations also entails not transferring the financial consequences of our choices to our children and grandchildren. The Treaties should include a clause that forbids the accumulation of additional EU debt.’²¹

The European Council’s decision²² to allow the Commission to launch a 750-billion-euro debt issuance is seen as a ground-breaking political and economic move, sometimes referred to as the EU’s ‘Hamiltonian moment,’ a concept popularized by Paul Volcker to signify a critical juncture in fiscal and budget policy innovation, in reference to Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury of the United States (1789–1795). Yet experts contend that the distinct differences between the contexts of the EU and the US mean that such comparisons have limited utility.

Charles Kesler, a senior fellow at the Claremont Institute, argues that the pre-United States entities were not truly nations since they did not feature thirteen distinct languages or histories. Essentially, they were interconnected, either as part of the British Empire or, later, outside it. American politics, especially debates around states’ independence and their right to secede, which the Civil War (1861–1865) ultimately addressed, reflected this unity and contention. Kesler highlights that, from Alexander Hamilton’s perspective, the establishment of a central republican government was a given. The American Constitution implicitly assumes all states maintain republican forms of government, granting the federal government authority to ensure this adherence, as stipulated in the Constitution’s ‘Republican Guarantee Clause’. According to him, Europe is in a very different situation; in fact, he doubts that the quality of republican government and the degree of popular consent is at its highest in Brussels. He reminds readers that at the same time the governments of the individual nations of Europe are not so much inferior in the quality of their democracy to that of the bureaucratic apparatus at the centre, which, by the way—according to Professor Kesler—Hamilton would in fact be horrified by, at least in terms of its operation.²³ Professor Kesler’s thoughts, however, will not make the situation unfolding around the joint debt less alarming; thus the Hungarian initiative around forbidding the accumulation of additional EU debts is worthy of wider consideration.

‘Europe’s future identity hinges on its spiritual and cultural direction’

‘European democracy needs to navigate away from the impasse created under the influence of the European Parliament. Representatives of the European Parliament must be delegated by the national parliaments, thereby granting authentic political legitimacy. It should also be feasible for national parliaments to halt undesirable EU legislation. Furthermore, both member state governments and national parliaments should have the capacity to begin EU legislative processes.’²⁴

This concept effectively transforms the European Parliament into a quasi-bicameral institution, elevating meaningful debates about the future of the EU from occasional to central. From a political point of view, this framework is viable: as noted by Swiss legal scholar Emmerich de Vattel in the eighteenth century, sovereign and independent states have the ability to form a confederation while fully maintaining their statehood: ‘[F]inally, several sovereign and independent states may unite themselves together by a perpetual confederacy, without ceasing to be, each individually, a perfect state. They will together constitute a federal republic: their joint deliberations will not impair the sovereignty of each member, though they may, in certain respects, put some restraint on the exercise of it, in virtue of voluntary engagements. A person does not cease to be free and independent, when he is obliged to fulfil engagements which he has voluntarily contracted.’²⁵

‘Protection of national indigenous minorities residing within the European Union must be stipulated by the founding Treaties, and efforts should be made to subsidize them.’²⁶

The European Commission had a chance to give real meaning to the EU’s contractual commitment to ‘respect the fundamental structures of the member states’.²⁷ A pivotal moment presented itself with the Minority SafePack citizens’ initiative, aimed at safeguarding national and linguistic minorities, which garnered the support of 1.1 million citizens. However, the Commission decisively rejected²⁸ this initiative. In its refusal, Brussels highlighted that safeguarding the interests of national minorities within member states falls outside its jurisdiction, unlike the protection of values associated with, for example, LGBTQI movements in Europe.

‘The Treaties should be amended to explicitly reinforce the European integration prospects of Western Balkan countries.’²⁹

The summit of the European Council on 23–24 June 2022 aimed to extend the EU’s geopolitical reach, at least in theory. It appears that the line-up of countries eagerly awaiting entry into the EU may have grown longer. Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia have spent years, even decades, aspiring to shift from candidate status to full EU membership. By the end of June, Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova also achieved candidate status,³⁰ marking a diplomatic victory for these nations. However, this achievement might be overshadowed if the leadership of these candidate countries engages in competitive bids and, out of frustration, begin to cast doubts on the EU’s credibility.

Just to be clear: there is no provision in this mandate suggesting that if the Hungarian government finds these objectives unattainable, it should contemplate leaving the EU. Such a move would be seen as taking the easy way out. Based on what Steven Bray told me about Brexit, however, my conclusion is that the path for the British is no easier. Even the ‘Leave’ party tends to agree with this. That road leads to an uncertain future—notably, just like the one member states, busy grappling with each other and the EU bureaucracy, are going down on. Nonetheless, the founding treaties of the EU emphasize the principle of equality among member states at the negotiating table, where their leaders come together for consultations multiple times a year.

That is an ace in our hand, which is why it is not surprising that Euro-federalists advocate for the abolition or at least the partial bypassing of unanimous voting. So, the task is to put up a fight and enforce the prevailing contractual provisions. The prime minister himself said nothing more or less than this in his 2023 remarks in Tusnádfürdő; indeed, he could not have.

NOTES

1 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Meet the EU Spin Doctors Working to Spread Hungarophobia’, Hungarian Conservative, www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/eu_hungarophobic-_politicians_ guy_verhofstadt/, accessed 3 April 2024.

2 Parts of the article below were originally published in the online version of the Hungarian Conservative.

3 See for example the speech by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán on the 176th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848–49, https://miniszterelnok.hu/en/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-on-the-176th-anniversary-of-the-hungarian-revolution-and-war-of-independence-of-1848-49/, accessed 3 April 2024.

4 Zsolt Sarkadi, ‘A harsogó csönd Orbán Viktor szavai közt’ (’The Resounding Silence between Viktor Orbán’s Words’), Telex, https://telex.hu/belfold/2023/07/22/orban-viktor-tusvanyos-tusnadfurdo-beszed, accessed 3 April 2024.

5 Sarkadi, ‘A harsogó csönd Orbán Viktor szavai közt’.

6 ‘Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

7 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

8 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

9 ‘La democrazia sara cristiana o non sara democrazia. Una democrazia anticristiana sarà una caricatura, che sfocerà nella tirannide o nella anarchia.’ (Democracy will be Christian or it will not be democracy. An anti-Christian democracy will be a caricature, resulting in tyranny or anarchy.) Robert Schuman, Per L’Europa (Edizioni Cinque Lune, 1965), 73.

10 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

11 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

12 Pope Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno: Encyclical Letter on Reconstructing the Social Order, Washington, D.C., National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1942.

13 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

14 ‘Commitments and cooperation in this area shall be consistent with commitments under the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, which, for those States which are members of it, remains the foundation of their collective defence and the forum for its implementation.’ See: ‘Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union.’

15 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

16 Friedrich Schiller, An die Freude (1786). Translated by William F. Wertz.

17 Századvég, ‘Európa Projekt, Család’, www.koppmariaintezet.hu/docs/Csaladok_Szazadveg.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

18 Tünde, Fűrész, ’People All Over the World Vote for Family’, Hungarian Conservative (19 January 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/family_children_hungarian-family-policy_ global-example_women_workplace_harmony/, accessed 8 April 2024.

19 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

20 Mark Higgie, ‘Christianity, Migration and Multiculturalism’, Hungarian Review, 10/6, https://hungarianreview.com/article/20191115_ mark_higgie_-_christianity_migration_and_multiculturalism/, accessed 3 April 2024.

21 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

22 European Council, ‘EU Recovery Package: Council adopts Recovery and Resilience Facility’, www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/02/11/eu-recovery-package-council-adopts-recovery-and-resilience-facility/, accessed 3 April 2024.

23 Gergely Dobozi, ‘“Hungary is Just Playing the Cards that One Is Dealt in the EU.” An Interview with Professor Charles Kesler of Claremont McKenna College’, Hungarian Conservative, accessed 3 April 2024. www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/interview/charles_kesler_claremont_sovereignty_diplomacy_federalism_hungary/, accessed 3 April 2024.

24 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

25 Emmerich De Vattel, The Law of Nations (Liberty Fund, 2008), 84.

26 ‘Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

27 ‘The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government. It shall respect their essential State functions, including ensuring the territorial integrity of the State, maintaining law and order and safeguarding national security. In particular, national security remains the sole responsibility of each Member State.’ See: ‘Article 4 Paragraph 2 of Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union’.

28 Tamás Orbán, ‘Minority SafePack: Indigenous Minorities Let Down by Europe—Again’, Hungarian Conservative (18 November 2022), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/opinion/minority-safepack-indigenous-minorities-let-down-by-europe-again/.

29 Paragraph 6 of Decision No. 32/2022 of 19 July of the Hungarian National Assembly on the Hungarian Position to Be Represented Regarding the Future of the European Union’, www.parlament.hu/irom42/00364/00364.pdf, accessed 3 April 2024.

30 ‘Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova Sign EU Deals’, Politico (27 June 2014), www.politico.eu/article/ukraine-georgia-and-moldova-sign-eu-deals/.