The rise of Asian countries is unfolding before our eyes, yet we fail to notice or anticipate it. Western leaders are either blind to this shift or lack the strength and vision to address the economic challenges that lie ahead. With one exception: Viktor Orbán. But what is he saying exactly, and why will he likely be proven right again?
This is what the prime minister said in a recent lecture at the Ludovika University of Public Service:
‘There is no doubt that in recent years the global economy has changed, that there has been a shift of emphasis. In the Government Balázs Orbán describes this as a “world system change”, while as Prime Minister – being more romantically inclined – I describe it as “two suns in the sky”. Meanwhile the Governor of the Central Bank and his associates regularly warn us to “keep a sharp eye on Asia in the coming decades”. And indeed, so far trade among Asian countries has accounted for about 15–16 per cent of world trade as a whole, with all forecasts predicting that in the foreseeable future trade among Asian countries will grow to 60 per cent of total world trade. This is the future. Obviously, the dynamism is in Asia: it has the most money, the biggest banks, the biggest investment funds, the biggest companies, research institutes, universities, innovations and patents. This process cannot be stopped.’
Let me quote some tangible examples to illustrate the Hungarian prime minister’s statements. When discussing Asia’s economic rise, commentators tend to focus solely on China, or perhaps India. However, the true Asian miracle lies in the economic performance of the so-called ‘little tigers’—the countries of Southeast Asia and Oceania. To explore this, I will compare the GDP of six such countries with the GDP of the six largest European economies recorded in 2007, prior to the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and their respective projected figures for 2024.
The twelve countries are Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, compared with Germany, the UK, France, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands.
Nominal GDP in billions USD | |||||
2007 | 2024 | 2007 | 2024 | ||
Indonesia | 432 | 1470 | Germany | 3426 | 4591 |
Thailand | 263 | 549 | UK | 3091 | 3495 |
Singapore | 181 | 514 | France | 2661 | 3130 |
Philippines | 156 | 472 | Italy | 2213 | 2328 |
Vietnam | 77 | 466 | Spain | 1474 | 1647 |
Malaysia | 194 | 445 | Netherlands | 849 | 1142 |
Sum | 1303 | 3916 | Sum | 13714 | 16333 |
Although these numbers cannot be determined or compared with absolute precision, they provide a reasonably accurate picture of the economic achievements of Southeast Asia and Western Europe over the past decade and a half.
In 2007, the combined economy of the six European nations in our example was more than ten times larger than that of the six Asian countries. Over the past 17 years, these Asian countries have grown by over 300 per cent—tripling in size—while Europe’s leading economies expanded by just 19 per cent. This means that the more than tenfold difference in 2007 has shrunk to just over four times (4.17).
If we examine the growth trajectories of these countries, as well as the external and internal factors influencing their economies, we can make a rough estimate of what the situation will look like by 2034. By then, the combined nominal GDP of the selected Asian countries is expected to range between 5.15 and 6.7 trillion USD. These figures are estimated based on current economic growth trends and forecasts, though numerous factors could affect the final outcomes.
For the European economies, the combined nominal GDP is projected to be between 17.7 and 19.8 trillion USD by 2034. This means that, even with optimistic estimates, the economic gap—almost elevenfold in 2007—could shrink to just 2.64 times within ten short years.
This raises serious questions—not just about the illustrative comparison or the economic rise of Asian countries but about the logic behind the operation of the Western-dominated world order. What is this logic?
The unwritten (and in some cases written) rule of the global geopolitical game is as follows: The United States and its immediate allies possess such economic and military dominance, along with successful and well-functioning societies and political systems, that what they say goes. In the best-case scenario, this need not even be imposed, as considering that our citizens are the freest and happiest, and what political leader would not want the same for their people? In less fortunate cases, they impose their will through economic means, sanctions, and their vastly superior financial power—or, in the worst-case scenario, through military force. This has worked for the past 35 years.
However, the world has changed. China, especially following its 2001 entry into the WTO and its rapid post-2008/09 crisis growth, has managed to approach the United States in such a way that it has forced the US into continuous debt accumulation and an economic marathon race. And it’s not just the ‘big dragon’; the ‘little tigers’ are also racing ahead economically. The US is trying to keep up, but its direct ally, Europe, has almost given up the fight. Consequently, it will be increasingly difficult to impose Western will, expectations, and goals on the rapidly developing Asian countries (a clear example of this is the failure of the sanctions on Russia). One tool is, therefore, out of play.
Another tool, the enviable success of societies and political systems, is also in crisis, perhaps even more so than the economy. The American Dream has been dead since the turn of the millennium; private property is under threat in the West; Europe’s population is shrinking; nation-states have been diluted, with multicultural societies poisoning the indigenous cultures; families, religion, and morality are being eroded by stealthy ideologies. Democratic capitalism has failed almost everywhere, with popular will either stifled or unable to express itself at all, leading to the emergence of Farage’s party, Le Pen’s victory, Germany’s failing government coalition, the Spanish elections, Wilders’ victory in the Netherlands, etc. Our societies are ailing, depressed, and have lost their identity, while legacy political parties have become captives of the establishment, the media, and NGOs, unable to offer solutions. Thus, our second tool of global hegemony has also been lost.
The third is not even a real tool. Military power is good for deterrence and prevention but not for symptom or cause treatment. Resorting to it would mean war or a world war, which no one wants. And if we’re honest, does the world today look like it fears Western military supremacy? Iran does not look very deterred, and neither does Russia.
What remains then? Hope. Hope, on the one hand, for the revival of Western political systems, for a resurgence of love for freedom, patriotism, and popular will. Donald Trump’s victory is currently the brightest star in this hope. And hope that the West, led primarily by the United States, will be able to become a feared and respected global enforcer and lead by example again if it can sort its internal affairs out, peacefully resolve current global conflicts through strength, and send a clear message to the world that there is still a reason to be in awe of the US.