Trump’s Comeback Victory and Its Electoral Implications

Kimberly Gregory, a Republican employee with Turning Point, distributes American flags and Trump stickers to the Republican voters arriving to vote at a polling station at City Hall in Surprise, Arizona, on Election Day, 5 November 2024.
Olivier Touron/AFP
‘Republicans should be especially concerned about their ability in the post-Trump era to retain gains in the Rust Belt, where the president-elect is uniquely popular among white working-class voters. Trump has twice carried Michigan and Pennsylvania, which hadn’t voted for a Republican candidate since 1988, and Wisconsin, which a Republican hadn’t won since 1984.’

President Donald Trump’s November 5 reelection unleashed joy among American conservatives, and indeed among conservatives worldwide. From a pragmatic electoral standpoint, it was a sigh of relief.

Prior to this result, a Republican had not won the popular vote—the raw national vote count, a symbolic but suggestive measure in U.S. elections—in two decades, and only once since 1988.

On the more important state level, the situation has been only slightly more favorable for the GOP. The Electoral College map had narrowed for Republican candidates. A state’s competitiveness often changes over time, and Republicans have in this decade solidified former swing states Ohio, Iowa, and–most critically–Florida. Yet, the states Republicans have been forced to defend are collectively more valuable: Arizona, Georgia, North Carolina, and Texas, in particular.

Texas (which Democrats fiercely contested in 2020 but generally conceded in 2024) is a transformative prize. Losing Texas would give Republicans virtually no path to victory. It would also change partisan perceptions of the entire Electoral College system. Currently, criticism of the system is focused on the Left. Democrats are more likely to win the popular vote but lose the election, something that happened in both 2000 and 2016. If Texas flips, so does that narrative. If this event came to pass, corporate media outlets like the New York Times and Washington Post could be expected to change tune and support the Electoral College.

America’s Founding Fathers designed the Electoral College to prevent the interests of large states from overshadowing those of smaller ones. In its current iteration, theoretically, the voters of the most closely divided states enjoy the most democratic power. Candidates spend most of their time in these states and tailor their platforms to win their votes. For example, President Trump’s ‘No Tax on Tips’ initiative was an appeal to Nevada’s many service-industry workers. Candidates regularly promise policies benefiting the auto industry in a nod to Michigan voters.

Under a popular vote system, which the Left regularly demands, candidates would spend most of their time and energy in the most heavily populated metro areas. New York and California would then be the centers of campaigning, in addition to the centers of fundraising. Democratic voices often ridicule Wyoming, America’s least-populated state and the largest concentration of electoral votes per capita, but the reality is that Wyomingites are unlikely to enjoy much campaign attention under either system.

In 2024, most campaign activities occurred in the widely acknowledged ‘swing states’ of Arizona, Georgia, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. Both parties have fiercely contested the ‘Blue Wall’ states of Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin for decades, but the southern and western ‘Sun Belt’ states have been more recently competitive. Demographic change drives most of these trends. Immigration, interstate migration, and socioeconomic political shifts are the key factors. Of these, President Trump won only North Carolina in 2020; he also prevailed in Florida and Texas, which Democrats contested that year but largely wrote off in 2024. In his historic comeback campaign, in which he survived two assassination attempts and incessant ‘lawfare,’ President Trump won every swing state en route to a 312–226 Electoral College victory.

The People Who Count the Votes Decide Everything

‘It is enough that the people know there was an election,’ goes an apocryphal quote misattributed to Stalin. ‘The people who cast the votes decide nothing. The people who count the votes decide everything.’ Though the Soviet dictator likely never uttered these words, they have entered the ranks of American folk wisdom as vote-counting controversies have become regular developments in American politics.

Americans were universally relieved when the presidential contest did not hinge on a small number of late-counted votes. Several Senate and House races proved more complicated. The Senate races in Rust Belt swing states Pennsylvania and Wisconsin were especially contentious and created further distrust over American election integrity.

A late-night ballot dump once again flipped a key race in Wisconsin. While the victim in 2020 was President Trump, this time it was Republican Senate challenger Eric Hovde. Throughout much of the evening and early-morning hours, Hovde maintained a lead of roughly 50,000 votes over Democratic incumbent Senator Tammy Baldwin. Then, at approximately 4 a.m., a ballot drop in Milwaukee County yielded 108,000 votes, 90 per cent of which supported Baldwin. Milwaukee is Wisconsin’s largest metro area, and a reliable source of Democratic votes, but President Trump nonetheless won 43 per cent of votes in that country in 2024. Baldwin outperforming Kamala Harris in that county by such a wide margin, across such a large batch of ballots, is statistically improbable.

Furthermore, 25 Milwaukee County wards reported ballot totals exceeding 100 per cent of the number of registered voters; one ward reported a figure exceeding 200 per cent of registered voters. While Hovde had the legal right to a recount, as the official margin of Baldwin’s victory was less than one per cent, he ultimately declined to press the issue. ‘Without a detailed review of all the ballots and their legitimacy, which will be difficult to obtain in the courts, a request for a recount would serve no purpose because you will just be recounting the same ballots regardless of their integrity,’ he explained. As of this writing, there is no proof of fraud or other wrongdoing, but these abnormalities will continue to cast a pall over Wisconsin election results until a thorough investigation occurs or the state legislature reforms election procedures.

Republicans secured a more favorable outcome in Pennsylvania, but not without legal jockeying. Republican challenger Dave McCormick unseated three-term incumbent Senator Bob Casey Jr. by a slim 15,000 votes, or just over 0.2 per cent. McCormick’s lead dwindled as late-counted ballots trickled in, but it remained large enough to rule out a change of outcome. Nonetheless, Casey refused to concede the race.

Despite a ruling from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court that confirmed state law requiring valid signatures and dates on mail-in ballots, election officials near Philadelphia began to count invalid ballots. ‘I think we all know that precedent by a court doesn’t matter anymore in this country,’ said Diane Ellis-Marseglia, the Democratic county commissioner in Bucks County, in suburban Philadelphia. A second state Supreme Court ruling confirmed that the invalid ballots could not be counted, and Casey finally conceded on November 21. When the Pennsylvania Department of State announced an official recount on November 13, McCormick held a lead of approximately 30,000 votes; when the dust settled, the margin was halved. As in Wisconsin, there is no evidence of fraud, but the duration and uncertainty of this race’s vote tabulation do not instill confidence in the American election system.

In western states, the pace of vote-tabulation added to this perception of a broken system. In swing states Arizona and Nevada, President Trump won by enough votes to be declared the winner within a couple days after Election Day—an unreasonably slow timeline—but contentious Senate races dragged on even longer. The Democratic candidates ultimately won in both states after days of uncertainty. Media outlets called the Nevada race on November 8, and the Arizona race on November 11, three and six days, respectively, after Election Day. As of November 10, five days after Election Day, Nevada had only tabulated 83 per cent of ballots, and Arizona had counted 70 per cent; other western laggards included Oregon (72 per cent), Washington (66 per cent), Utah (60 per cent), and California (46 per cent).

It doesn’t have to be this way. Embarrassed by the irregularities and incompetence that determined the razor-thin 2000 presidential election between Vice President Al Gore and Texas Governor George W. Bush, the Florida legislature passed the ‘Election Reform Act of 2001,’ which allowed the state to become arguably the gold standard in election administration. The law banned notorious punch-card voting machines, allowed counting of mail-in ballots to begin 25 days before Election Day, required that early-voting results be posted within 30 minutes of poll closing, and stipulated that mail-in ballots be received by 7 p.m. on Election Day. These provisions mean Florida results are reliably reported within hours of poll closings, and Americans look to that state for early election-outcome signs. State legislatures—if not federal Trump administration officials—would do well to implement similar measures to restore the perceived integrity of American elections.

The Elephant in the Room

Former President Barack Obama is a revered figure among Democrats, but some remember him as uniquely skilled at getting himself elected, while failing to help many down-ballot Democratic candidates. This same criticism might be levied at President Donald Trump.

Republicans should be especially concerned about their ability in the post-Trump era to retain gains in the Rust Belt, where the president-elect is uniquely popular among white working-class voters. Trump has twice carried Michigan and Pennsylvania, which hadn’t voted for a Republican candidate since 1988, and Wisconsin, which a Republican hadn’t won since 1984. All three of these states have Democratic governors, and four of their combined six senators are Democrats. All three states held Senate elections in 2024, and the Republican candidates trailed Trump’s vote totals in each of them. Only in Pennsylvania did Trump win by enough to carry the Republican, Dave McCormick, across the finish line. In these races, a significant number of voters either split their ticket by voting for Trump and the Democratic Senate candidate—an increasingly rare phenomenon in American politics—or voting for Trump and casting no vote in down-ballot races. Both outcomes are troubling for Republicans.

It is unclear whether prominent Republicans like Vice President-elect J.D. Vance, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis, or Virginia Governor Glenn Youngkin could preserve Trump’s gains in the Rust Belt. In 2018 and 2022, the off-year (non-presidential) elections thus far during the Trump era, Democrats have won four of five Senate elections and all six gubernatorial elections in the trifecta of Rust Belt states. Any suggestion that these states have flipped into the Republican column are premature.

Nor are these electoral concerns limited to the Rust Belt. Democratic Senate candidates also won in Arizona and Nevada, swing states that Trump carried. In North Carolina, Republican gubernatorial candidate and sitting Lieutenant Governor Mark Robinson, who was battered by controversies throughout his campaign, ran a staggering ten points behind Donald Trump.

Georgia has been a particular struggle for Republicans during the Trump era. It had been a reliable Republican state for decades, since the realignment that initiated GOP dominance in the southern states. Like much of the Deep South, Georgia has a large black population. The rapid growth of the Atlanta metro area, one of the largest in the South, has stimulated migration of white-collar voters from northern states and flipped once-safe Republican suburban areas to areas of Democratic strength. The combination of these groups has made the state uniquely competitive in the region.

Donald Trump carried the state by a surprisingly thin margin in 2016. Then, in 2020, it was the site of a Republican catastrophe. Vice President Biden officially won the state by under 12,000 votes, the first time a Democrat carried it since Bill Clinton in 1992. A special election meant the state held two 2020 Senate elections, both of which Democrats won in runoff races. In 2022, Senator Raphael Warnock won for the second time in two years, in the race to fill the seat for its full six-year term.

Both presidential campaigns targeted Georgia from the beginning of the 2024 race. Trump prevailed by 115,000 votes, or 2.2 per cent. Nonetheless, Vice President Harris improved on Joe Biden’s margins in several Georgia counties, particularly in suburban areas of Metro Atlanta. The long-term Republican outlook in the Peach State is troubling unless the GOP can make more substantial inroads with black voters or reverse its hemorrhaging support among educated white-collar voters.

Kamala Is for They/Them. President Trump Is for You.

Of course, Republicans have much to celebrate. President Trump, who possesses unique political baggage and inspires unprecedented derision within American institutions, won the popular vote and every swing state. Gloomy predictions of shifting demographics have not materialized. In fact, they have reversed among some key voter groups.

In the oft-referenced ‘autopsy‘ after Mitt Romney’s loss to President Barack Obama in 2012, numerous analysts insisted Republicans would need to embrace immigration and appeal on conventional neoliberal terms to Hispanic voters, among others. The Trump era has turned this institutional wisdom on its head.

In 2016, Donald Trump tapped into white working-class enthusiasm with a populist, anti-globalism campaign. In subsequent elections, he has increased his support with Hispanic voters and, to a lesser extent, black voters.

In 2020, President Trump rebuffed a concerted Democratic push to flip Texas by making tremendous gains among Hispanics in South Texas, many of whom trace their roots in the region to several generations. Similar strength among Hispanic voters helped Trump secure a surprisingly comfortable win in Florida that year.

In 2024, these trends became more apparent. Vice President Harris won Hispanic voters by a modest 53–45 margin. It was the highest such figure ever for a Republican presidential candidate and represented a 13-point increase for Trump from 2020. Harris underperformed Joe Biden among Hispanics in every swing state except Wisconsin. She underperformed Biden by 15 percentage points in Texas and 11 in Florida. Trump won heavily Hispanic Starr County, along the Mexican border in Texas, the first such victory for a Republican in over a century. He also won urban Miami-Dade County, in Florida, another remarkable achievement for a Republican candidate. If Republicans can maintain this strength among Hispanic voters, they can hope to offset losses in white-collar areas and forestall predictions of voter-pool collapse.

President Trump also won more black voters than any Republican candidate in half a century. ‘The breadth of the improvement Donald Trump had…holy Toledo!’ remarked CNN’s Harry Enten. ‘These are the types of groups that you would never have thought Donald Trump would have gained so much support among eight years ago when he first went against Hillary Clinton.’ He approximately doubled his support among black men under age 45 and increased his share of black voters by five percentage points in the southern swing states of Georgia and North Carolina.

The Harris campaign bet heavily on the gender gap. Abortion was arguably her biggest talking point. She emphasized it regularly in female-targeted campaign events like an appearance on the podcast Call Her Daddy. A television ad in swing states depicted two wives secretly voting for Harris despite pressure from their cartoonish pro-Trump husbands. When the results were tabulated, the Democrats’ gender strategy fizzled. Harris won female voters by a modest 53–45 margin, and she even lost white women by a 53–46 margin.

Another remarkable demographic development was President Trump’s comparative strength in safe Democratic states, an outcome that propelled him to his popular-vote victory. He improved his performance from 2020 by 11 percentage points in New York, ten in New Jersey, and nearly nine in Massachusetts and California. Trump lost New Jersey by a respectable 5.9 percentage points, the first time in two decades a Republican pulled within single digits there, and an outcome that has led optimistic Republicans to claim that the party should begin contesting that state. It is notable that these gains in blue areas did not culminate in a sweeping Republican victory in the House of Representatives, as one might expect, demonstrating the impact of gerrymandering that both parties have wrought on the electoral map. (Ultimately, Republicans preserved their majority in the House by a narrow 220–215 count.)

Trump’s sweeping victory also disproves predictions of an inevitable leftward-moving zeitgeist. One particularly effective Trump campaign ad asserted, ‘Kamala is for they/them. President Trump is for you.’ The ad played frequently in swing states in the latter part of the campaign. ‘The cue of giving sex change procedures to inmates is so radical, it’s so extreme, and it’s one of those issues that touches on not just the culture war, but the economy, too,’ said Terry Schilling, president of the American Principles Project, which produced the ad.

Armed with his decisive election victory and small majorities in the Senate and House of Representatives, President Trump must now decide how to spend his political capital: culture war or economic policies; foreign policy in a time of global turmoil or domestic issues that have defined his political messaging; attacking the federal leviathan or merely taming it. President Donald Trump has defined an era of American politics. The next four years will determine whether he permanently reshapes American society.

‘Republicans should be especially concerned about their ability in the post-Trump era to retain gains in the Rust Belt, where the president-elect is uniquely popular among white working-class voters. Trump has twice carried Michigan and Pennsylvania, which hadn’t voted for a Republican candidate since 1988, and Wisconsin, which a Republican hadn’t won since 1984.’

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