This article was published in our print edition’s Special Issue on the European Union.

Prospects before the Pivotal European Elections

In the summer of 2024, Europe is gearing up for pivotal elections. From 5 to 9 June, voters across all EU countries will cast their ballots to determine which parties and MEPs will represent them in the European Parliament for the next five years. But this event signifies much more than a mere electoral process. The fundamental question at issue is whether Europe will successfully reclaim its position on the world’s geopolitical stage. Will pragmatism once again prevail as the driving force for cooperation, superseding ideological confrontations? Additionally, there is the pressing matter of whether the long-awaited shift towards right-wing policies within the EU will materialize.

Voters typically assign lesser significance to European Parliament (EP) elections, as evidenced by lower turnout rates compared to national parliamentary or municipal elections.¹ This trend stems from various factors, including the perception that the decision-making and legislative processes in Brussels are distant from their daily lives. Many voters feel they exert less influence on EU policy processes than they do on domestic affairs.

At the same time, however, the current tense international situation has heightened the significance of the EP elections, a sentiment felt by voters. For the first time in decades, there is a war raging in the neighbourhood of the EU, with profound adverse effects on the continent, directly impacting the daily lives of ordinary citizens. Escalating inflation, surging energy costs, and the disruption and transformation of supply chains are all contributing factors significantly affecting Europeans. Moreover, the ineffectiveness of Western sanction policies in response to the conflict is exacerbating these adverse consequences. For instance, while the Russian economy expanded by 3.6 per cent last year,² the economies of EU member states only managed to grow by an average of 1 per cent.³ 

Europe, under left-wing leadership, has veered off course from the path towards growth, stability, peace, and security, prompting a demand for change among the populace. This sentiment is not solely evident in weeks of farmers’ protests; Europeans have also expressed their discontent through recent election outcomes across several EU countries. The right wing has emerged victorious in elections in Italy, Slovakia, the Netherlands, and, most recently, Portugal. This trend may well persist this year, with anticipated right-wing successes in Belgium, Austria, and Romania.

The general dissatisfaction is also reflected in opinion polls: the latest survey of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) indicates that the political right is expected to strengthen in the June elections.⁴ As the survey report put it, ‘anti-European populists’ are leading the polls in nine member states: Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia. And they come second or third in a further nine countries: Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden.

In addition to the surge of right-wing movements, there is a noticeable trend across Europe of the left losing ground, including progressive and green parties. This shift is exemplified by the dwindling presence of parties affiliated with the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) political group in the European Parliament, now governing in only four EU member states. The S&D, which has been severely affected by the largest corruption scandal in EU history, is facing significant challenges. According to Politico’s Poll of Polls, the S&D could potentially secure only 138 MEPs out of the 720-member body after the June elections. The Greens find themselves in an even more precarious position, as they are projected to have only 43 seats compared to their current 72. Similarly, Renew’s support is experiencing a notable decline, with the number of MEPs in the liberal political group expected to decrease from 102 to 81.⁵

In terms of representation, the centre-right European People’s Party (EPP) could retain its position as the largest political group, with the potential to secure 178 seats in June. However, the most significant beneficiaries of the failures of recent left-wing policies could be the European Parliament’s conservative forces, namely the European Reformists and Conservatives (ECR) and Identity and Democracy (ID). ID has risen to become the third strongest political group in recent years, with a potential increase in seats from 59 to 85. The ECR has also experienced a notable surge in support, with the Eurosceptic group potentially swelling from 43 to 80 MEPs.⁶ According to press reports, Fidesz could join the ECR in the next parliament, further consolidating the strength of the European right.⁷

‘Europe, under left-wing leadership, has veered off course from the path towards growth, stability, peace, and security, prompting a demand for change among the populace’

In recent years, the focal point of the European right has shifted southwards, towards Italy. Following Giorgia Meloni’s electoral victory in September 2022, the government led by the Brothers of Italy (FdI) Party—which encompasses Matteo Salvini’s League Party and Forza Italia (FI), the party of the late Silvio Berlusconi, who passed away in 2023—has maintained stable support after a year and a half. Meloni recently expressed the expectation that her party will achieve a similar result in the EP elections as in the 2022 elections. ‘It is not often that a government can maintain that level of support after a year and a half in office’,⁸ stated the Italian prime minister. However, there is ample reason for optimism, as the FdI currently leads the polls with 28-per-cent support. While Meloni and her party are prominent members of the ECR, Italy’s significance in the upcoming elections extends beyond this affiliation. Matteo Salvini’s League is a steadfast component of ID, and the veteran politician has long harboured the dream of establishing an all-right political group in the European Parliament—though this currently seems unlikely to materialize.

One of Meloni’s key election promises was to take tough action on illegal migration, and she is making every effort to fulfil this pledge. Migration and the EU’s response to it will be one of the central issues during the campaign period leading up to the EP elections, with sharp differences between the right and left on this matter. While the current Commission and EP persist with the approach of distributing migrants, right-wing forces advocate for the protection of external borders and addressing the root causes of migration.

‘Progressive liberals in the European Union are not concerned about the European people. They prioritize their own ideals. If implementing their ideals requires dismantling European industry and agriculture, they will do so. And if it means erasing Europe’s cultural heritage through illegal migration, they will not hesitate to do that,’⁹ remarked Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán recently.

Speaking of illegal migration, it is also important to note that there has been a resurgence of right-wing movements in Germanic-language countries, from Austria to the Netherlands and Germany, with the former being particularly significant. In Germany, the strongly anti-immigration Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) Party has emerged as the second largest in the country. As a member of the ID political group, AfD’s performance is crucial for a right-wing shift. Until January 2024, it appeared that they were gaining momentum. However, the German and European progressive press initiated a smear campaign, filled with distortions, misrepresentations, and half-truths against the party.¹⁰ This campaign resulted in the AfD’s support dropping from 22 to 18 per cent in just two months. AfD is entering the summer elections with list leader Maximilian Krah, who stated in an interview with Hungarian Conservative that the scandal would not have a lasting impact on the party’s support.¹¹

‘The latest survey of the European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) indicates that the political right is expected to strengthen in the June elections’

The French National Rally (NR) could emerge as a significant player in a potential right-wing shift, with Marine Le Pen’s party leading the latest polls. According to Le Monde, NR currently commands 31 per cent of the vote, positioning them 13 percentage points ahead of French President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance Party.¹² Given that France boasts the largest number of MEPs—with 81 members—a strong performance by the French right, akin to the AfD, will be pivotal in the June elections. NR’s list is spearheaded by Jordan Bardella, whom Politico dubbed the ‘wonder boy of the French far-right’ back in 2019—a commendation of the highest order. Recent reports from the Brussels-based liberal outlet suggest that the French right could achieve its best-ever result in the June elections, with Reconquest, led by right-wing publicist Éric Zemmour, currently polling at 6 per cent alongside NR.¹³ Interestingly, a poll cited in the article reveals that 68 per cent of French citizens believe the country is heading in the wrong direction.

‘Most experts anticipate that despite the bolstering of the ECR and ID, the three mainstream political groups—the EPP, S&D, and Renew—will still be capable of securing a governing majority’

Moreover, Jordan Bardella’s adept and effective utilization of various social media platforms, including TikTok, has played a crucial role in bolstering the French right. Bardella’s ability to connect with younger generations through TikTok has been particularly noteworthy, contributing significantly to the party’s strengthening. This trend is not exclusive to France; across the European Parliament, Identity and Democracy (ID) MEPs are the foremost users of TikTok. Such engagement on social media platforms could significantly enhance their prospects of electoral success.¹⁴

Following their victory in the early elections of July 2023, which failed to result in the formation of a government, the upcoming summer EP elections hold paramount importance for the Spanish People’s Party (PP). Since last year’s elections, the Socialist government led by Pedro Sánchez has implemented a series of measures that have significantly undermined its popularity.¹⁵ These measures include granting amnesties to pro-independence Catalan leaders and facilitating quasi-independence for Catalonia through a referendum. Last November, tens of thousands of Spaniards staged weeks-long protests against Sánchez’s government, underscoring widespread discontent. Voters will have another opportunity to express their  dissatisfaction at the ballot box in June. Currently, the PP commands 36 per cent of the vote, leading the Socialists by 5 percentage points. These developments could also prove beneficial for the right-wing Vox Party, which currently holds 10 per cent of the vote, alongside the far-left Sumar.¹⁶ In Portugal, the right wing is also making significant strides, as exemplified by the Chega Party led by André Ventura, which quadrupled its seats in early elections held in March.¹⁷ This momentum is likely to carry over into the EP elections this summer. Similar to Salvini, Ventura has advocated for the establishment of an all-right European political group. During his visit to Hungary last May, Ventura stated in an interview with Demokrata that ‘We need to build bridges between Identity and Democracy and the European Conservatives and Reformists to formally or informally create a large conservative bloc that can work towards building the largest parliamentary group’.¹⁸

Since the last EP elections in 2019, the situation of the right has arguably undergone the most significant changes in Central Europe. The enduring alliance and cooperation between Fidesz, which has upheld a steady government in Hungary since 2010, and the Polish Law and Justice (PiS) Party, in power for two terms, have shaped relations in the region for many years. The harmony within the Hungarian–Polish axis experienced some strain due to the war in Ukraine, during which the parties held differing positions on the conflict. Furthermore, last October, despite winning the most votes in the Polish elections, PiS failed to form a government. PiS, which has also been grappling with internal power struggles, has subsequently witnessed a decline in support. Currently, the Civic Coalition (KO) led by Donald Tusk is leading the polls, making the upcoming EP elections in the summer the most challenging time for PiS.¹⁹

The June elections will hold immense significance for Hungary on several fronts. Fidesz has long been regarded as the strongest right-wing party in Europe, with Viktor Orbán emerging as a prominent figure not only within the European sphere but also on the international right in recent years. However, the pardon scandal in February²⁰—which resulted in the resignation of President of the Republic Katalin Novák and Judit Varga, the designated leader of the Fidesz-KDNP EP list—along with its aftermath, has inflicted damage on the party’s popularity to an extent not witnessed in quite some time. Despite this setback, it is important to note that in the opinion polls Fidesz still maintains a substantial lead over opposition parties, and is poised to achieve results similar to those of five years ago. Nonetheless, the EP elections present an opportune moment to gauge the true political repercussions of the pardon scandal.

However, for Hungary there is even more at stake. The Hungarian government has been engaged in a prolonged conflict with Brussels and the left-wing-dominated European Parliament, resulting in the withholding of over €20 billion in EU funds that Hungary rightfully deserves, on various—largely fatuous—grounds. Many of these issues stem from ideological clashes between the government and Brussels.²¹ According to Orbán, the only viable solution to resolve these conflicts is for right-wing forces to gain control in Brussels.²² This would pave the way for genuine cooperation between sovereign member states and the Commission, grounded in pragmatism.

Furthermore, Hungary is set to assume the rotating EU presidency immediately after the elections. Central to the government’s agenda is combatting illegal immigration and reforming the EU’s migration policy.²³ Without the support of right-wing political groups, achieving these objectives would be an arduous if not impossible task.

Indeed, the European right is currently at its zenith, yet the extent of its influence remains uncertain. Most experts anticipate that despite the bolstering of the ECR and ID, the three mainstream political groups—the EPP, S&D, and Renew—will still be capable of securing a governing majority. Orbán himself has adopted a cautious stance, acknowledging that there will inevitably be a move towards rationality in Europe. However, whether this shift will culminate in a significant breakthrough or merely a redistribution of power dynamics remains to be seen.²⁴

One thing is certain: the longstanding dominance of the left in Europe appears to be waning as the summer elections approach, and a shift in the centre of political gravity after 9 June seems likely. This could signify the onset of a significant right-wing resurgence in the West, particularly with the US presidential elections scheduled for November, where former Republican president Donald Trump stands a solid chance of winning. The potential return of Trump to the presidency has been a source of concern for the European left for several months²⁵, given his opposition to the Brussels elite on numerous key issues, such as the war in Ukraine and the support provided for Kyiv.

Against this backdrop, the forthcoming European Parliament elections hold particular significance: will they catalyze a right-wing surge that could indirectly bolster Donald Trump’s chances of victory? The possibility is certainly there. As Orbán emphasized in his address on 15 March: ‘We are on the brink of a sovereign revolution in America and Europe, where normal life can be restored, and a great era of Western nations can commence.’²⁶

NOTES

1 ‘Voter Turnout in the European Parliament Elections in the European Union (EU) from 1979 to 2019’, Statista (22 February 2024), www.statista.com/statistics/300427/eu-parlament-turnout-for-the-european-elections/, accessed 22 March 2024.

2 ‘Russia Full Year GDP Growth’, Trading Economies, https://tradingeconomics.com/russia/full-year-gdp-growth, accessed 22 March 2024.

3 ‘Annual Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Growth Rate in European Countries in 2023’, Statista (14 February 2024), www.statista.com/statistics/686147/gdp-growth-europe/, accessed 22 March 2024.

4 Kevin Cunningham et al., ‘A Sharp Right Turn: A Forecast for the 2024 European Parliament Elections’, European Council for Foreign Relations (23 January 2024), https://ecfr.eu/publication/a-sharp-right-turn-a-forecast-for-the-2024-european-parliament-elections/, accessed 22 March 2024.

5 ‘Poll of Polls’, Politico, www.Politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/, accessed 22 March 2024.

6 ‘Poll of Polls’.

7 Tamás Orbán and Zoltán Kottász, ‘PM Orbán Indicates Willingness to Join Conservative ECR Group in European Parliament’, European Conservative (2 February 2024), https://europeanconservative.com/articles/news/pm-orban-indicates-willingness-to-join-conservative-ecr-group-in-european-parliament/, accessed 22 March 2024.

8 Paddy Belton, ‘June’s EP Elections Could Turn Italy’s PM Meloni into EU Kingmaker’, Brussels Signal (21 March 2024), https://brusselssignal.eu/2024/03/junes-ep-elections-could-turn-italys-pm-meloni-into-eu-kingmaker/, accessed 22 March 2024

9 Ádám Bráder, ‘Viktor Orbán: We Will Send the Soros Empire to the Rubbish Heap of History’, Hungarian Conservative (21 March 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/viktor_orban_speech_brussels_hunyadi-janos-award_nations_sovereignty/, accessed 22 March 2024.

10 “Joakim Scheffer, ‘Distraction, Division, and Smearing: Anatomy of the AfD Scandal’, Hungarian Conservative (24 January 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/opinion/distraction-division-and-smearing-anatomy-of-the-afd-scandal/, accessed 22 March 2024.

11 Joakim Scheffer, ‘“Hungary Offers a Decent Life without Fear”—An Interview with AfD Top Candidate Maximilian Krah’, Hungarian Conservative (31 January 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/interview/ep-elections_afd_germany_hungary_interview_maximilian-krah/, accessed 22 March 2024.

12 Julie Carriat, ‘European Elections Poll: Far Right 13 Points Ahead of Macron’s Camp, Gap Widening’, Le Monde (11 March 2024), www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2024/03/11/european-elections-poll-far-right-13-points-ahead-of-macron-s-camp-gap-widening_6606410_5. html, accessed 22 March 2024.

13 Nicolas Camut, ‘French Far Right Poised for Record Surge in EU Election, Poll Shows’, Politico (12 February 2024) www.Politico.eu/article/french-far-right-poised-record-surge-eu-parliament-election-poll-shows-bardella-national-rally/, accessed 22 March 2024.

14 Clothilde Goujard, Elisa Braun, and Mark Scott, ‘Europe’s far right uses TikTok to win youth vote’, Politico (17 March 2024), www.Politico.eu/article/tiktok-far-right-european-parliament-politics-europe/, accessed 22 March 2024.

15 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Left-Wing Leaderships Plunge Europe into Chaos’, Hungarian Conservative (13 January 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/left_wing_leaderships_europe_chaos/, accessed 22 March 2024.

16 ‘Poll of Polls’.

17 Joakim Scheffer, ‘PM Orbán’s Ally Gains Big in Portuguese Snap Elections’, Hungarian Conservative (12 March 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/portugal_elections_chega_andre-ventura_viktor-orban/, accessed 22 March 2024.

18 Mariann Őry, ‘Csak egységben lesz konzervatív reneszánsz – André Ventura Orbán Viktorról’, Demokrata (8 May 2023), https://demokrata.hu/vilag/csak-egysegben-lesz-konzervativ-reneszansz-andre-ventura-orban-viktorrol-678240/, accessed 22 March 2024.

19 ‘Poll of Polls’.

20 Gergely Dobozi, ‘Brace Yourselves for a Wild Game, Hungarian Conservatives’, Hungarian Conservative (13 February 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/opinion/novak_varga_resignation_opinion_conservatives_child_protection/, accessed 22 March 2024.

21 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Brussels’ Rule of Law Concerns: A Mask for Hidden Agendas’, Hungarian Conservative (18 January 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/politics/rule-of-law-concerns_hungary_european-commission_imposing_leftist-ideology/, accessed 22 March 2024.

22 Joakim Scheffer, ‘“We must take control of Brussels!”— Viktor Orbán Addresses the Nation on 15 March’, Hungarian Conservative (15 March 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/viktor-orban_15-march_hungary_europe_european-elections_sovereignty_freedom/, accessed 22 March 2024.

23 ‘Foreign Minister: Hungary’s EU Presidency Will Prioritize Action on Illegal Migration’, Hungary Today (19 January 2024), https://hungarytoday.hu/foreign-minister-hungarys-eu-presidency-prioritizes-action-on-illegal-migration/, accessed 22 March 2024.

24 Joakim Scheffer, ‘Viktor Orbán on the Hungarian Economy, the War in Ukraine and a Right-wing Europe’, Hungarian Conservative (4 March 2024), www.hungarianconservative.com/articles/current/viktor-orban_hungarian-economy_war-in-ukraine_right-wing-shift_europe/, accessed 22 March 2024.

25 Eddy Wax and James Angelos, ‘Europe Prepares to Stand Alone as Trump Returns’, Politico (16 January 2024), www.politico.eu/article/europe-prepares-stand-alone-as-us-trump-returns-2024-elections/, accessed 22 March 2024.

26 Scheffer, ‘“We must take control of Brussels!” — Viktor Orbán Addresses the Nation on 15 March’.

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