This article was published in our print edition’s Special Issue on the European Union.
In light of a number of recent global developments, Europe’s role as an ally of the United States appears to have changed. Nowadays, what is at stake is nothing less than the ability of our continent to chart its own course. Twenty years after joining the European Union, it is not only the Central and Eastern Europeans who are worried about the future prospects of the old continent. Amid the many far-reaching tectonic shifts occurring in the world order, significant changes can be observed in global power structures. In the midst of these processes, Europe appears to be without ideas, direction, and leadership. As a result, achieving ‘strategic autonomy’1 for our continent is more difficult than ever, though it is precisely in such complicated times that this autonomy is most relevant, timely, and necessary.
The Lessons of 1989
In 1989, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe shook off the oppressive communist yoke, regained their independence and the chance to develop in peace and freedom. As a result, state and nation, sovereignty and self-determination, and freedom and democracy all became sacred concepts in their eyes. Accession to Euro-Atlantic multinational bodies was seen as a pledge of their own independence and desire for freedom, in contrast to the darkness they had experienced under Soviet oppression. So, of course, they helped each other to achieve this goal.2
For them, the model of Europe stood as the polar opposite of the former dictatorial power of the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the societies of Western Europe had never experienced communism first-hand, since the USA—which protected them—was the torchbearer of freedom and democracy. As such, Western Europeans were able to enjoy their own freedom, often in the context of Christian democracy, in a mutually beneficial symbiosis with the USA.3 While the Soviets brutally dominated and suppressed the territory under their control by military means, the Americans used a sophisticated soft-power toolkit to exert tremendous influence over Europe—especially in the fields of culture, political decision-making, institutions, and lobbying groups.4
When the Eastern Empire collapsed, the West felt like the winner of the Cold War, as at first the USA remained almost the only leading power on the stage, and it also remained culturally and politically dominant in the shaping of Europe and the world. Given the experiences of dictatorship and the positive-sounding Western alternative, in the years after 1989, the nations of Europe unanimously saw American hegemony as both desirable and useful, and as a result, the leading role of the USA was hardly ever called into question.
The Familiar World Is Changing
However, with its freedom of action and overwhelmingly dominant position, the USA was increasingly exposed to the risk of overextension. Culturally conservative America lost ground politically, while left-liberal, progressive America became increasingly dominant. This could be seen in such fields as academia, the media, non-governmental organizations, associations, and ultimately also in politics. These shifts in power have led to, among other things, ‘Wokeism’, cancel culture, a narrowing of discursive freedom, and a cultural arrogance of power in the name of liberalism, which is in reality less and less liberal.
‘Europe’s self-assertion must play a central role. However, for this, Europeans must be able to recognize, articulate, and assertively represent their goals and interests on the international stage’
These movements have also gained strength in Europe, as have left-liberal, progressive ideas. Europe’s old Christian-democratic cultural base has been gradually eroded, but Christian democrats were late in recognizing this erosion, and in looking for effective ways of dealing with it. For example, in Germany, a series of grand coalitions pushed the CDU/ CSU into the background.5 At the same time, ‘progressive’ America continues to spread its aspirations for hegemony with great vigour and force.
The Rise of Asia
In 2022, the beginning of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine opened a new front in world politics. The free West led by the USA—along with Europe and the English-speaking countries of the old Commonwealth—firmly stood by Ukraine, while other countries around the world, including democratic states, were unwilling or unable to commit to this position. In particular, the global South and BRICS countries, as well as Israel, have not fully sided with Ukraine, but continue to pursue their own interests.
The same basic attitude also applies to the competition between the USA and China, in which the aforementioned countries do not want to take a clear position and have no fundamental objections to close ties with China. According to some, however, the war in Ukraine could be seen as a test run for a possible conflict between China and the United States.6 If we look, globally, at the largest trading partners of these countries, we can conclude that in 2000 the USA was in first place almost everywhere, whereas today, for most countries, it is China by a large margin. The dynamic growth of states previously described with the unflattering epithets ‘emerging’ and ‘developing’ stands in stark contrast to slow rates of growth in the established West. It cannot be completely ruled out that the future direction of global development will be set in Southeast Asia or elsewhere.
In this context, Central and Eastern Europeans do not want to be left out of the developments taking place on a global level, and are looking for opportunities to develop functional and multilateral manoeuvring room. They see no advantage in a ‘West versus the rest’ return to bloc-based global politics, as they have a negative historical experience of blocs, from which, in the main, they lost much and gained nothing.7 That is why they are trying to explore new possibilities for action. They stand for global free trade, dialogue, and networking, as they have understood the need to strive for good and solid relations with as many countries as possible in the fields of economy, science, and politics.
Value- and Interest-Based Policies
The values of the West are comprehensive, but not universal, and are applicable mainly within the sphere of influence of the Western world; in many other countries they are questioned, rejected, or even suppressed. As such, a value-based foreign policy can hardly be effective in such a diverse global environment. Moreover, values are largely intangible, cannot be accessed or negotiated, and are valid only within one’s own culture and sphere of influence.
In the case of interest-driven politics, on the other hand, it is easier to find a balance and reconcile a range of varying interests.8 Hungary, for example, pursues an interest-based foreign policy,9 and in doing so attempts to reach fair, balanced, win-win arrangements with a variety of global players. Given its own experiences, the country is better able to understand the interests of others, and those experiences also teach that it is urgently necessary for Europe to define its own fundamental interests and to properly represent and implement them. However, this happens all too rarely. Instead, references are frequently made to vaguely defined ‘European values’, and, in terms of the framework for global action, the only regularly cited partnership is with the USA—which, although necessary, is not in itself sufficient.
Strategic Autonomy
Given the above trends, it is legitimate to consider the extent to which Europe can develop its own strategic direction, in the spirit of the ‘strategic autonomy’ advocated by French President Emmanuel Macron. This would be a prerequisite for Europe to be able to articulate its own interests, and to be able to act as a global player even without the involvement of the USA. Similarly, Europe must find strong leaders to even embark on such a process. In this context, a recognition that European politics must be able to formulate its own decision-making principles in the long term, regardless of which American president is in the White House, is overdue.
In the meantime, although the currently indispensable alliance with the USA must be preserved, Europe must be prepared to stand its ground in international politics without Washington, not least because America will one day pursue its own interests without the Europeans, or even in the face of European opposition. However, due to Russia’s still ongoing war against Ukraine, the space for action has unfortunately narrowed, to Europe’s detriment. In such a fraught state of conflict, any further efforts towards European strategic sovereignty may be interpreted as turning away from the USA, which is certainly not in the interest of Europeans.
A fundamental rethink of European strategic autonomy may only become realistic after the armed conflict in Ukraine ends. However, that may still be a long way off, so European efforts in this regard must be put aside for the time being. This is not a good sign for the future prospects of our continent.
Connectivity
The strategy of connectivity was first formulated in Hungary, and represents the intensive thinking taking place in this medium-sized Central European country. In a work published in 2023, Balázs Orbán explained the idea outlined by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán at the beginning of the year, and presented at international forums.10 In a multipolar world, it is in Hungary’s interest to be connected by as many threads and connections as possible to many of the world’s major economic actors. In a bipolar world, there is always the danger that Hungary will remain on the periphery, as we saw on many occasions during the twentieth century. This must be avoided at all costs, as the ‘century of Hungarian loneliness’ is now over, and accordingly, our country is an integral part not only of Central European and pan-European, but also of global cooperation.11 This strategy of networking and interconnection is a consequence of the increasingly evident decline in US hegemony. The world order is evidently becoming multipolar, and the countries of Europe must also successfully react to this. A turn away from globalization and towards bloc-based thinking threatens not only the prosperity of Europe, but also its long-term security.
‘Strategic autonomy for Europe is advocated as a prerequisite for articulating its own interests and acting as a global player independently from the USA’
The Outlook
The international reorganization resulting from the changed role and situation of the United States will not be without consequence for Europe. At the same time, due to political and cultural challenges, there are at least serious questions regarding the future prospects of the transatlantic model we are familiar with today. An interest-driven foreign policy and strategic networking can help us stay on track in a changing global environment. More and more Central and Eastern Europeans are increasingly favouring this approach.
‘An interest-driven foreign policy and strategic networking can help us stay on track in a changing global environment’
In this context, Europe’s self-assertion must play a central role. However, for this, Europeans must be able to recognize, articulate, and assertively represent their goals and interests on the international stage. The continent’s strategic sovereignty is a desirable medium-term goal, which, due to the ongoing war, is difficult to achieve without seriously questioning the foundations of the transatlantic community. Therefore, a lasting peace must be established as soon as possible in war-torn Ukraine.
Translated by Thomas Sneddon
NOTES
1 Elisabeth Koch, ‘European Strategic Autonomy after Macron’s Trip to China’, Wilson Center (9 May 2023), www.wilsoncenter.org/article/european-strategic-autonomy-after-macrons-trip-china, accessed 2 February 2024.
2 András Braun, ‘The Role of Central Europe in Supporting the Euro-Atlantic Endeavours of Ukraine’, Casimir Pulaski Foundation (31 May 2023), https://pulaski.pl/en/pulaski-commentary-the-role-of-central-europe-in-supporting-the-euro-atlantic-endeavors-in-ukraine-challenges-and-opportunities-andras-braun-2/, accessed 2 February 2024.
3 Christine Wormuth, ‘The United States and Europe since World War II’, RAND Corporation (26 March 2019), www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/testimonies/CT500/CT506/RAND_CT506.pdf, accessed 2 February 2024.
4 Viktor Orbán, ‘Speech at the Jubilee Celebration for the Weekly Magazine Weltwoche’, About Hungary (22 November 2023), https://abouthungary.hu/speeches-and-remarks/speech-by-prime-minister-viktor-orban-at-the-jubilee-celebration-for-the-weekly-magazine-weltwoche, accessed 2 February 2024.
5 Gergely Gulyás, ‘Politikauffassungen in Deutschland und Ungarn’ (Political Views in Germany and Hungary), in: Der ungarische Staat. Ein interdisziplinärer Überblick (Wiesbaden, 2021), 21.
6 Susanne Schröter, Global Gescheitert. Der Westen zwischen Anmaßung und Selbsthass (Global Failure: The West between Arrogance and Self-Hatred) (Freiburg im Breisgau, 2022), 179.
7 Balázs Orbán, Huszárvágás – a konnektivitás magyar stratégiája (Hussar Cut: The Hungarian Strategy of Connectivity) (Budapest, 2023), 148.
8 Heinz Theisen, Selbstbehauptung: Warum Europa und der Westen sich begrenzen müssen (Self-Assertion: Why Europe and the West Must Limit Themselves) (Reinbek, 2022), 131.
9 Werner Patzelt, ‘Ungarn verstehen’ (Understanding Hungary), in: Geschichte. Staat. Politik (München, 2023), 379.
10 Balázs Orbán, ‘Connectivity: A Hungarian Globalisation Strategy’, The European Council on Foreign Relations (6 March 2023), https://ecfr.eu/article/connectivity-a-hungarian-globalisation-strategy/, accessed 2 February 2024.
11 Viktor Orbán, ‘Commemoration Speech’, About Hungary (6 June 2020), https://abouthungary.hu/prime-minister/primeminister-viktor-orbans-commemoration-speech-trianon, accessed 2 February 2024.
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