Mainstream international media appears to have already launched its electoral campaign ahead of the 2026 parliamentary elections in Hungary. After the British newspaper The Times published a glowing profile of Hungarian opposition leader Péter Magyar in early March, the leader of the Respect and Freedom (Tisza) party has now appeared in an exclusive interview with the German outlet Deutsche Welle.
Given these recent publications, it is not difficult to determine which side the mainstream supports. Before delving deeper into Magyar’s latest international media appearance, it is important to note that such promotion by Western progressive, left-leaning outlets is neither unusual nor surprising. In fact, this has been the case in at least the last two Hungarian parliamentary elections: while spending over a decade criticizing Viktor Orbán’s government and its policies, these media organizations—and the political forces they serve—have consistently promoted whichever challenger to the Hungarian prime minister is currently fashionable—and often overrated. In 2022 it was Péter Márki-Zay, the opposition coalition’s candidate; in 2018 it was Gábor Vona of Jobbik (a former far-right party that shifted to a more centre-right position); and in 2026 it appears to be Péter Magyar.
A Well-Constructed Propaganda Piece
As for the Deutsche Welle interview, there is little of substance to highlight. It is, in essence, a propaganda piece, with questions designed to be favourable from the outset, omitting crucial details about Magyar’s trajectory both before and after his political rise. The reporter introduces him as follows: ‘Magyar himself was a government insider under Prime Minister Orbán, but he walked away from the ruling Fidesz party and all state-financed jobs in protest over a corruption scandal.’
This statement itself distorts the timeline and context of Magyar’s political career. While it is true that he previously held several high-paying public positions—such as head of the Hungarian Student Loan Centre and member of the supervisory board of MBH Bank—, he did not resign from these roles in protest over a corruption scandal. Rather, he had been removed from these posts long before the scandal broke in February 2024, which led to the resignations of former Hungarian President Katalin Novák and Magyar’s ex-wife, former Justice Minister Judit Varga.
Contradictions in Magyar’s Narrative
In the interview, Magyar attempts to position himself and his party as ‘all-inclusive’, pledging to ‘reunite the nation’. ‘One of our main aims is to reunite the nation, to stop the propaganda, to stop the hate speech, and to speak about the reality, the conditions, the state of play of our country,’ he declared. In practice, however, the opposite appears to be true of both the opposition leader and his supporters.
While frequently accusing Fidesz supporters of acting like cult members devoted to Viktor Orbán, the same criticism could easily apply to Tisza—except that Magyar has built his ‘cult’ at a much faster pace. Claiming to support national unity, oppose hate speech, and promote truth rings hollow when Magyar regularly attacks nearly every media outlet and broadcaster, both left and righ leaning, in Hungary, branding them as government-financed propaganda. He routinely insults senior government figures, including the prime minister. Over the past year Magyar has constructed a reality around himself that excludes any information or perspective that does not fit his narrative—whether related to geopolitical developments or domestic events. This includes aggressive acts against civilians, for which legal proceedings are currently under way against the Tisza leader.
‘Magyar has constructed a reality around himself that excludes any information or perspective that does not fit his narrative’
A key aspect of Magyar’s political image—one that could help foreign observers understand the current Hungarian context—is that he has correctly recognized the lack of domestic support for progressive, left-wing policies. As a result, he is attempting to present himself as a conservative, right-wing alternative to Orbán. In practice, this means closely mirroring much of the Hungarian government’s policy positions, initiatives, and even rhetorical style. For instance, Magyar frequently quotes Viktor Orbán in his speeches. In the Deutsche Welle interview, he admitted that a potential Magyar-led government would retain some of Orbán’s flagship policies, including the internationally recognized family policy and the southern border fence aimed at deterring illegal migration. On Monday Tisza launched its own ‘national consultation’, which Magyar described as a ‘referendum’ against Orbán’s regime. This tool—used to consult citizens on key national issues without calling a formal referendum—was introduced by Fidesz in 2010 and has since become a staple of Hungarian political life.
Magyar also stated in the interview that the next Hungarian prime minister’s first priority should be to travel to Brussels to ‘negotiate with the European Commission, with all the institutions, and to defreeze the EU funds.’ That would likely be the easiest task for Magyar and Tisza, as they have already extended overtures to Manfred Weber’s European People’s Party (EPP). We know for a fact—given the swift release of funds following Donald Tusk’s return to power in Poland—that the European Union has no qualms about unfreezing financial support when a government aligned with its political agenda comes to power. This is the case even when there are clear signs of democratic backsliding and politically motivated judicial actions against opponents.
‘But let us be clear: had Magyar been in charge during the 2015 migration crisis, there would have been no border fence’
Such behaviour undermines Magyar’s claim to be a conservative alternative to Orbán, as he appears ready to abandon one of the current Hungarian government’s—and basically any conservative force’s—core values—sovereignty. With an unconditional commitment to Brussels’ interests, none of the aforementioned flagship policies could realistically be preserved under a future Tisza government. Orbán’s stance on migration and the border fence ultimately led Fidesz to leave the EPP, and the European Commission continues to demand changes to Hungary’s migration policy as a condition for releasing frozen EU funds. This contradiction was, of course, ignored by Deutsche Welle’s reporter. But let us be clear: had Magyar been in charge during the 2015 migration crisis, there would have been no border fence, and Hungary would likely have experienced the same collapse of public security and social cohesion that inclusive migration policies have brought to parts of Western Europe.
Behind the Sugar-Coated Image
In conclusion, two key takeaways emerge from the interview. First, mainstream media has evidently begun its campaign for the 2026 Hungarian elections on the side of Magyar and Tisza, and further PR interviews and articles from similar outlets can be expected. Second, although these reports portray Magyar as a competent and composed political figure, the reality is that he often buckles under pressure. A more revealing portrayal can be seen in his interview with the progressive Hungarian media outlet Partizán, where—unlike with Deutsche Welle—Magyar faced difficult and at times uncomfortable questions and quickly revealed his true character.
In that Partizán interview—an outlet symbolic for Tisza, as Magyar made his first public appearance there in February 2024—Magyar dodged questions he disliked and grew visibly frustrated with the direction taken by host Márton Gulyás. At one point, he completely lost his composure. When asked about allegations of insider trading, he raised his voice, demanded to know when the interview would end, and declared that the journalists who had published the audio recordings related to the case should be imprisoned, citing Western countries as examples. This interview gives a more accurate depiction of who Péter Magyar really is—not the sugar-coated image presented by Western media.
Watch both interviews below:
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